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• Since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, central banks and supervisors have 
introduced a plethora of policy measures to respond to its economic and financial 
consequences, using both conventional and unconventional instruments. Many of 
the same institutions have also been deepening their commitment to taking action 
to confront the systemic threat of climate change and environmental decline.  
• In June 2020, we released the 1st edition of the Sustainable Crisis Response Toolbox, 
setting out how central banks could join the dots between these two agendas. The 
Toolbox sets out measures in three broad categories – monetary, prudential and 
‘other’ – and includes nine types of tools. It provides central banks and financial 
supervisors with options to align their crisis response measures. 
• This 2nd edition of the Toolbox significantly expands the empirical assessment of the 
crisis response of central banks and supervisors globally and examines how far 
central banks are incorporating climate and other environmental factors into their 
COVID-19 strategies and wider operations.  
• Our core finding is that there is currently a divergence between crisis response 
measures and wider efforts to promote sustainable finance. So far, less than 1 per 
cent of central banks and supervisors from 188 economies have directly connected 
their crisis response with sustainability factors.  
• However, more than 20 per cent of these same institutions have also scaled up their 
broader sustainability efforts since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis. Authorities in 
Europe and East Asia are the most active in terms of these parallel sustainability 
efforts. This highlights the potential for convergence in the next phase. 
• Many of the instruments that are already being applied by central banks and 
financial supervisors in the crisis could be calibrated in ways that account for 
climate- and other sustainability-related risks and objectives. Doing this will enable 
central banks and supervisors to avoid the build-up of climate risks in the financial 
system. It would also align their actions with the growing call from national 
governments, international organisations and central banks themselves for a green 
recovery from COVID-19.  
• The updated Toolbox provides a framework for achieving this integration, and 
reinforces the importance of focusing attention on four areas for priority action: 
1. Amending collateral frameworks to account for climate change-related and 
other environmental risks. 
2. Removing the carbon bias within corporate asset purchase programmes and 
align refinancing operations with Paris Agreement goals.  
3. Adjusting prudential measures to minimise climate risks and strengthen 
disclosure and stress testing requirements. 
4. Adopting sustainable and responsible investment principles for portfolio 
management, including policy portfolios. 
• Central banks and supervisors should now work to overcome the gap between their 
strategic commitment to climate action and the delivery of crisis response measures. 
Practical steps include the development of agreed sustainability classifications that 
can be applied to calibrate their crisis interventions, and updating core conventions 
such as the ‘market neutrality’ principle.  
• In future research, we will investigate the technical and regional implementation 





Central banks and financial supervisors have taken measures extraordinary in both nature 
and scale to respond to the financial and economic crisis brought about by the COVID-19 
pandemic. They have played a crucial role in the immediate stabilisation phase and this 
will continue in the recovery phase. The policies adopted during the crisis will have 
profound implications for long-term outcomes and need to be consistent with climate and 
sustainability goals, contributing to a just transition to a sustainable economy. Indeed, the 
pandemic provides an opportunity to do things differently and better. In the words of Isabel 
Schnabel (2020), Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, “COVID-19 
provides a chance to build a greener economy” and “build a deeper and greener 
financial market that reduces the costs of transitioning towards a low-carbon economy”. 
Aim of the paper 
This briefing is designed to provide central banks and financial supervisors with an 
empirically based toolbox of options to align their crisis response measures with climate and 
sustainability objectives and mitigate potential sustainability risks. It has been produced by 
the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at LSE and the 
Centre for Sustainable Finance at SOAS for the International Network of Sustainable 
Financial Policy Insights, Research and Exchange (INSPIRE), a research stakeholder of the 
Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). It builds on the first edition released in 
June 2020 by extending the analysis of the uptake of sustainability-linked measures.  
Why should central banks and supervisors be concerned with climate change and 
the environment at this time of crisis? 
The shock caused by COVID-19 has served to deepen rather than deflect the strategic 
case for central banks and supervisors to fully integrate the long-term risks associated with 
climate change and environmental degradation into their routine operations. As a 
zoonotic disease – one that has crossed from animals to humans – COVID-19 has shown the 
fragility of human systems and there is an increasing likelihood of similar pandemic diseases 
as deforestation, biodiversity loss and climate change intensify. COVID-19 has also 
accelerated many fundamental trends in the global economy, bringing forward the peak 
in global oil demand by many years, for example (Evans, 2020). In this way, it has been a 
live ‘transition stress test’, showing that sustainability factors are not a distant threat but are 
shaping markets today. 
Given these circumstances, the strategic rationale for central banks and supervisors to 
incorporate climate and sustainability factors into their crisis response measures, as set out 
in the first edition of the Toolbox, remains relevant and reinforces the key arguments for 
action by researchers and policymakers over recent months:  
1. To ensure that climate risks are accurately reflected in central banks’ balance sheets 
and operations, particularly in the context of pervasive market failures.1 
2. To reduce climate-related risks in regulated financial institutions through effective 
prudential supervision.  
3. To avoid the build-up of climate-related risks at the level of the financial system.  
4. To support the efforts of governments to deliver a green recovery from COVID-19 in 
line with the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals.2   
                                                            
1  Strictly speaking, central banks are not existentially threatened at present by their exposure to climate risks, given their ability to expand the 
money supply if these risks should manifest in their balance sheets. There is, however, an important signalling effect to central bank actions. 
2  This support can be part of the primary or secondary mandates and depends not only on the jurisdiction, but also on the perception of risks. 
If climate change is perceived as a systemic risk, supporting the government can be interpreted as an insurance strategy, as long as it does 




2. Key features of the Toolbox 
Tools and areas 
The instruments that are being 
applied by central banks and 
financial supervisors in the crisis 
can be calibrated in ways that 
first, account for climate- and 
other sustainability-related 
financial risks and, second, 
contribute to the achievement 
of climate and sustainability 
goals. To enable this, the Toolbox 
identifies nine different types of 
tools, grouped in three broad 
areas: monetary policy, financial 
stability, and ‘other’, as 
summarised in Box 1.  
The full Toolbox is set out in Section 6. It presents the policy tools available to central banks 
and financial supervisors, distinguishing between conventional (often sustainability-blind) 
measures and those that are sustainability-enhanced, i.e. measures that take climate and 
wider sustainable development factors into account. Details from our empirical review of 
the COVID-19 response by central banks and supervisors in 188 economies, identifying 
which tools have been applied and with what sustainability dimensions, are provided in 
Section 7.  
The current situation, in which central banks are implementing large-scale stimulus 
measures, presents an important moment for alignment with climate and sustainability 
policies. Liquidity-enhancing stimulus measures that are not aligned with sustainability 
objectives could contribute significantly to the build-up of sustainability-related risks in 
portfolios of financial institutions and within the financial system as a whole by locking in 
investment pathways. The easing of countercyclical and other prudential instruments 
without a sustainability-risk-sensitive calibration could further increase these risks. This issue is 
particularly pressing as many central banks and supervisory authorities are currently relaxing 
micro- and macroprudential standards to encourage lending by financial institutions. This 
means that the implementation of prudential instruments that account for sustainability risks 
– and climate risks in particular – should not be delayed, but rather be strengthened to 
prevent the build-up of additional volatility in portfolios. Finally, the profound social 
consequences of the COVID-19 crisis have highlighted the need for central banks and 
supervisors to consider the role they could play in delivering a just transition – one that is 
inclusive of and fair to all groups it affects – alongside governments and other actors in the 
financial system (Thallinger and Robins, 2020). 
The Toolbox includes both monetary and financial stability-related instruments, since each 
type is currently employed by central banks and supervisors for countercyclical policy 
responses. Monetary expansion that is calibrated by central banks to achieve an inflation 
target (in expectation of a certain time horizon), but does not take sustainability objectives 
into consideration in its operational implementation (e.g. in open market operations, 
standing facilities and reserve requirements), creates an even stronger urgency for 
supervisors to address the potential build-up of climate-related risks in the calibration and 
current easing of prudential instruments. Instruments such as interest rates, asset purchase 
Box 1: Types of tools in the Toolbox  
1. Monetary policy   
(1) Collateral frameworks   
(2) Indirect monetary policy instruments   
(3) Non-standard instruments   
(4) Direct monetary policy instruments    
2. Prudential policy: Regulation and supervision   
(5) Microprudential instruments   
(6) Macroprudential instruments   
3. Other policies   
(7) Further financing schemes and other initiatives   
(8) Management of central bank portfolios   




programmes and collateral framework changes are usually seen as the main crisis response 
tools. However, the countercyclical calibration of prudential instruments, including capital 
buffers, liquidity coverage ratios (LCR) or loan-to-value ratios (LVR), is also actively used and 
can therefore be discussed as a crisis response measure that needs to be aligned with 
sustainable objectives in the current context, and for which general progress should not be 
delayed (e.g. tools 5, 6, 8 and 9 in the Toolbox; see Section 6).  
Informed by global experience 
Central banks and supervisors across different jurisdictions operate within different 
mandates and legal frameworks (Dikau and Volz, 2020a). They also face diverse challenges 
in their economies and financial systems. This has strong implications for the selection of 
instruments that can be employed and for the degree to which a country-specific 
selection of them could be calibrated in a sustainability-enhanced way. The Toolbox draws 
on global experience, reflecting differing financial cultures and objectives of central banks 
and supervisors around the world. Instruments that are seen as standard by some central 
banks may not conventionally be used elsewhere (e.g. directed lending in India, targeted 
refinancing in Bangladesh and window guidance in China).3 It is clear that there is no ‘one-
size-fits-all’ recommendation for crisis response measures that support a transition towards a 
sustainable economy. 
At the same time, acknowledging that different institutions have different mandates should 
not be taken as a reason for inaction. The response of central banks and supervisors to 
COVID-19 has demonstrated the vast array of policy measures and instruments potentially 
at their disposal, and renders ongoing debates redundant regarding the availability of a 
number of ‘unconventional’ measures. The threat of financial crisis brought on by COVID-19 
provides a uniquely clear picture of what measures each institution is capable of. Now, 
these measures should take climate and sustainability into account. 
What have we learned since the first edition of the Toolbox? 
We have discussed the first edition of the Toolbox widely with central banks and supervisors. 
The following main themes emerged from these discussions: 
• The current crisis has become a live example of a disruptive transition. At the onset of 
the crisis, however, all efforts were entirely focused on rescuing the economy, with 
little consideration for sustainability goals. 
• Adding sustainability criteria to existing directional policy frameworks, such as 
refinancing operations that target specific sectors (such as SMEs), was identified as 
potential low-hanging fruit for central banks. 
• The absence of common definitions, classifications and taxonomies has held back 
integration. However, practical approaches are emerging for how interventions 
(such as monetary operations) can be calibrated with sustainability factors.  
• The incorporation of sustainability and climate or environmental risk-related factors 
into prudential policy is often complicated by gaps in methods and data. 
• The lack of coherent disclosure frameworks was highlighted as a key bottleneck, 
constraining sustainable finance policy in practice and specifically in the context of 
the crisis response of central banks and supervisors.  
• The time horizon of financial regulation, usually three to five years, was discussed as 
a central factor hindering the incorporation of environmental and climate risks into 
                                                            
3  While in the absence of well-developed financial markets some central banks in emerging and developing economies may have to rely on 
these direct instruments for the implementation of monetary policy, these tools may be inappropriate or even harmful if implemented by 




prudential policy. An extension of this timeframe and the use of scenario analysis 
could help overcome this.  
• The importance of further and enhanced capacity-building efforts for central banks 
and supervisors is a key enabling factor for the application of the sustainable 
instruments suggested in the Toolbox. 
• Last but not least, it was highlighted that the Toolbox was relevant beyond the crisis, 
as central banks and supervisors need to account for sustainability risks and align 






3. How sustainable is the crisis response  
in practice? 
Our empirical investigation sheds light on the use of available instruments since the start of 
the crisis. We investigate the policy responses of central banks and supervisors of 188 
economies, drawing on the International Monetary Fund’s Policy Responses to COVID-19 
Policy Tracker.4 We complement this with information from the homepages of central banks 
and supervisors as well as media reports. Section 7 gives a full overview of the responses to 
the COVID-19 crisis taken globally up to October 2020 by monetary and financial 
authorities.  
Figure 1 provides an overview of the relative use of tools in the nine instrument categories of 
the Toolbox. It shows that, with the exception of changes in central bank portfolio 
management practices (category 8), instruments in all categories have been widely used. 
Unsurprisingly, the adjustment of indirect monetary policy instruments (category 2) is used in 
48 per cent of the 188 economies, dominating the crisis response. This is followed by a 
change of microprudential instruments (category 5) in 39 per cent of the economies. 
Overall, Figure 1 illustrates the broad variety of instrument categories from which financial 
policymakers have drawn their response. In all economies, central banks and supervisors 
have relied on at least one of the monetary or prudential crisis response measures in the 
Toolbox. This shows that prudential and monetary policies have played central roles 
globally in the immediate crisis responses.  
Figure 1. Percentage of economies in which central banks and supervisors have employed 
instruments in each of the categories of the Toolbox 
Source: Compiled by authors based on the table in Section 7 of this report. Notes: In each category the 
percentage of countries out of the total 188 in which central banks or supervisors have employed instruments is 
displayed. Initiatives under ‘(9) Supporting sustainable finance’ are not crisis response-related, but are 
independent initiatives that have been launched during the time in question. 
Turning to the sustainability dimension, the following findings emerge: 
• In only one economy has the monetary authority explicitly calibrated a crisis 
response instrument in a sustainability-enhanced way: the Reserve Bank of Fiji raised 
its Import Substitution and Export Finance Facility by FJ$100 million to provide credit 
to, among others, renewable energy businesses at concessional rates. 
                                                            
4  Available at www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 
Key to instruments (X-axis):  
1. Collateral frameworks 
2. Indirect monetary policy 
instruments 
3. Non-standard instruments 
4. Direct monetary policy 
instruments 
5. Microprudential instruments 
6. Macroprudential instruments 
7. Further financing schemes and 
other initiatives 
8. Management of central bank 
portfolios 
9. Supporting sustainable finance 





















• However, central banks and supervisors in 40 economies (or 21 per cent of the total) 
have taken parallel measures that fall into category (9) of the Toolbox, sustainable 
finance – but it should be emphasised that these are not direct crisis response 
measures. 
• Regionally, Europe and East Asia have been most active in terms of introducing 
these parallel sustainability measures, as set out in Figure 2, which shows the use of 
instruments by region. We have not identified any sustainability measures being 
introduced during this period by authorities in North America or South Asia. 
• These parallel sustainability actions have been taken mostly by central banks and 
supervisors in high-income countries (with 42 per cent of economies taking at least 
one action), falling to 24 per cent of upper-middle-income countries, just 6 per cent 
of middle-income countries and no sustainability measures among low-income 
economies (Figure 3).5 
One insight from this empirical exercise is that many central banks have, in addition to 
lowering interest rates, moved quickly to expand their collateral frameworks to include a 
broader variety and quality of assets, implemented new or scaled-up existing quantitative 
easing programmes and introduced various targeted and non-targeted additional 
(re)financing and purchase facilities. Given that most of these instruments do not take 
environmental, social or climate-related risks into account, these efforts might slow the 
pace at which a just and sustainable transition can be achieved, and lead to a significant 
additional build-up of climate risk on the balance sheets of financial institutions, the 
financial system, and the economy as a whole. This risk could be exacerbated by our 
finding that most central banks and supervisors have eased countercyclical capital buffers 
and general (microprudential) regulation and supervisory standards. We recognise that the 
situation is highly dynamic, and many newly announced programmes will take time to be 
fully designed and implemented: this provides considerable scope for central banks and 
supervisors to ‘retrofit’ sustainability factors into their crisis response measures. 
The empirical evidence also illustrates national differences in the policy responses of central 
banks and supervisors, reflecting differences in legal mandates and associated differing 
degrees in policy space. While most of the crisis response measures presented in Section 7 
have been implemented as ‘market neutral’ and quantity-targeting easing or prudential 
release measures, there have also been numerous efforts by central banks and supervisors 
that aim to support specific sectors of the economy, most notably small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). In most cases, these instruments fall under the monetary policy category 
(category 4) of direct instruments. Assuming that this promotional calibration of instruments 
were aligned with government priorities to extend support to these specific sectors of the 
economy, central banks and supervisors potentially could be tasked to enhance 
sustainability efforts through similar instruments. 
In addition, there are noteworthy regional differences regarding the relative popularity of 
instruments in the different Toolbox categories (see Figure 2). In the East Asia and Pacific 
region, only 16 per cent of monetary authorities have implemented collateral framework 
changes, while 50 per cent of European and Central Asian central banks have recalibrated 
their frameworks. In contrast, indirect instruments have been adopted as crisis response 
measures more equally across the different regions. The use of direct monetary policy 
instruments is, as may be expected, less widely used by European and Central Asian 
economies (18 per cent), where financial markets are mostly well-developed. 
 
                                                            
5  This finding also reflects the membership of the NGFS, which has initially been dominated by central banks and supervisors from more 
advanced economies. It also points to the severe capacity constraints that can hold back sustainable financial policy implementation in 
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Figure 3. Use of Toolbox categories by income group (%) 
As shown in Figure 3, some of the regional differences can be attributed to income 
differences, which are also an indicator of the level of financial market development. For 
example, direct monetary policy instruments are slightly more popular in upper-middle- and 
lower-middle-income countries, where 35 and 36 per cent respectively of central banks 
adopted these, than in high- and low-income countries, where these instruments are used 
by only 30 and 15 per cent respectively of central banks. Furthermore, the analysis shows 
that central banks and supervisors in high-income countries have relied on a much broader 
set of policy instruments and categories in their crisis response than central banks in middle- 
and low-income countries. 
Parallel tracking: advancing sustainability but limited alignment with crisis measures 
A striking development of 2020 has been the intensification of central bank and supervisor 
commitment to action on climate change and sustainability. Leading examples of these at 
the national level are presented in Box 2, and steps taken in terms of collaborative action 
through the NGFS in Box 3. These steps are not directly related to the COVID-19 crisis, but 
show the potential for convergence in the next phase of the crisis.  
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Box 2. Sustainability initiatives by central banks and supervisors in 2020 
January 
• Abu Dhabi Financial Services Regulatory Authority: Launches the Abu Dhabi Climate Initiative. 
February 
• National Bank of Georgia: Joins NGFS and publishes environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
reporting and disclosure principles. 
• Central Bank of Hungary: Endorses the UN’s Principles for Responsible Investment. 
• Banco de México: Publishes report on Climate and Environmental Risks and Opportunities in 
Mexico’s Financial System. 
March 
• Central Bank of Ireland: Annual report announces the establishment of a Climate Change Team. 
• Banco de Portugal: Publishes commitment to sustainability and sustainable finance. 
April 
• BaFin: Makes sustainable finance a supervisory priority. 
• Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas: Approves a Sustainable Finance Framework. 
• Central Bank of Armenia, Banco Central do Brasil, Central Bank of Cyprus, Central Bank of West 
African States, Danish Financial Supervisory Authority, Eesti Pank (Estonia), Latvijas Banka (Latvia), 
Lietuvos bankas (Lithuania), Malta Financial Services Authority: Join NGFS. 
May 
• Financial Superintendence of Colombia: Creates the Sustainable Finance Working Group to 
implement its sustainability strategy and publishes a Good Practice Guide for Issuing Green Bonds. 
• Banco Central de Costa Rica: Strategic Plan 2020-2023 includes analytical activities on climate 
change. 
• European Central Bank: Launches public consultation on its guide on climate-related and 
environmental risks. 
• Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (France): Publishes a report on good practice in 
governance and management of climate-related risks. 
• Hong Kong Monetary Authority: Launches a Green and Sustainable Finance Cross-Agency 
Steering Group, development of a common framework to assess the ‘Greenness Baseline’ of 
individual banks. 
• Banxico: Creates a Sustainable Finance Committee together with the Ministry of Finance. 
• People’s Bank of China: Releases Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue. 
• Bank of Thailand: Announces sustainability as an integral part of all operations and as a strategic 
Challenge of the Bank’s Strategic Plan 2020–2022. 
June 
• People’s Bank of China: Publishes public consultation draft of its ‘Notification on Evaluation of 
Green Finance Performance of Deposit-Type Financial Institutions in the Banking Industry’. 
• Central Bank of Estonia: Launches report that outlines the long-term impact of climate change on 
the Estonian economy. 
• Banque de France: Launches responsible investment strategy. 
• Bank of Lithuania: Financial Stability Report 2020 addresses climate change challenges to financial 
stability. 
• De Nederlandsche Bank: Publishes report on biodiversity loss and associated risks. 
• Bank of Russia: Begins consultation on the prospects for estimating and monitoring of climate risks. 
• Monetary Authority Singapore: Publishes three consultation papers on Proposed Guidelines on 
Environmental Risk Management for banks, asset managers and insurers; launches the MAS Global 
FinTech Innovation Challenge. 
• Reserve Bank of South Africa: Publishes working paper on ‘Climate change and its implications for 
central banks in emerging and developing economies’. 
• Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority: Starts addressing climate risks in the financial sector. 
July 
• Bank of Mauritius: Joins NGFS. 
• Central Bank of Mongolia: Launches its Green Loan Statistics based on the Mongolian Green 
Taxonomy (2019) to calculate the amount and ratio of green loans in portfolios. 




• Sveriges Riksbank: Launches consultation on the sustainable finance strategy for improved and 
uniform disclosure of climate-related risks. 
August 
• Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas: Joins NGFS. 
• Central Bank of Colombia: Publishes working paper on ‘Climate Change: Policies to Manage its 
Macroeconomic and Financial Effects’. 
• Central Bank of Ecuador: Launches and leads Sustainable Finance Initiative. 
• Bank Negara Malaysia: Issues VBIAF Sectoral Guides on Palm Oil, Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency. 
• Bank of Thailand: Signs MoU with UK government, including consideration for the environment and 
risks from climate change. 
September 
• Bank Negara Malaysia: Starts pilot implementation of the Climate Change and Principles-Based 
Taxonomy. 
• Banco Central do Brasil: Launches sustainability agenda, embedding sustainability into currency 
reserves management, bank stress tests and lending criteria. 
• European Central Bank: Bonds with coupon structures linked to certain sustainability performance 
targets will become eligible as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations and also for Eurosystem 
outright purchases for monetary policy purposes. 
Source: Compiled by authors, drawing from central bank and supervisor homepages and reports.  
 
It is striking that almost all the instruments that are included in the Toolbox are currently 
being used as crisis response measures by central banks and supervisors, although not in a 
sustainability-enhanced calibration. Recent announcements point to how these instruments 
could be used as part of future crisis response actions. Examples include the 
announcements in September 2020 by the Banco Central do Brasil of its intention to create 
a sustainable liquidity financial line, and by the European Central Bank (ECB) of its intention 
to accept bonds with coupons linked to sustainability performance targets as collateral, 
with potential eligibility also for asset purchases under the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) 
and the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). Both are calibrations 
suggested in the Toolbox, but in practice so far have been unrelated to recovery policy. 
Clearly, further work is needed to bridge this gap between growing commitment to 
sustainability and the lack of integration to date in the crisis response to COVID-19. 
  
Box 3. Collaborative actions published by the NGFS in 2020  
‘Guide for Supervisors: Integrating Climate-related and Environmental Risks into Prudential 
Supervision’  
‘Status Report on Financial Institutions’ Practices with Respect to Risk Differential between 
Green, Non-green and Brown Financial Assets and a Potential Risk Differential’ 
‘Statement on the Need for a Green Recovery Out of the Covid-19 Crisis’  
‘Guide to Climate Scenario Analysis for Central Banks and Supervisors’ 
‘Climate Change and Monetary Policy: Initial Takeaways’  
‘The Macroeconomic and Financial Stability Impacts of Climate Change: Research 
Priorities’ 
‘Overview of Environmental Risk Analysis by Financial Institutions’  
‘Case Studies of Environmental Risk Analysis Methodologies’ 




4. Priority areas for integrating sustainability factors 
This Toolbox provides a framework for categorising the range of measures that central 
banks and financial supervisors can take to support a sustainable recovery from COVID-19 
and ensure that their crisis response measures do not have unintended consequences in 
terms of enhancing climate and other sustainability risks. In order to enable central banks 
and supervisors to take the next steps in practice, it will be important for further research to 
explore in greater technical detail the application of instruments in the particular 
circumstances facing individual countries during the crisis. Considerable scope also exists 
for collaboration between central banks, supervisors and researchers to explore priority 
actions across a range of countries and jurisdictions. Supporting this type of collaboration is 
a core goal of INSPIRE (INSPIRE, 2020). 
Without putting an undue burden on financial firms during this time of crisis, monetary and 
financial authorities can take steps now that would contribute to sustainable crisis 
responses and prevent a further build-up of climate risks in financial institutions’ balance 
sheets. Out of the broad range of central banking and supervisory instruments that are 
included in the Toolbox, four priority areas deserve special attention, described below. 
1. Collateral frameworks  
The underlying risk assessment for collateral frameworks could be adjusted to better 
account for climate change-related and other environmental risks, leading to a change of 
haircuts and collateral valuation, as well as of the eligible collateral pool. In a second step, 
assets from firms heavily exposed to climate-related transition risk could be excluded, which 
would have positive implications for the Paris-alignment of asset purchase programmes, 
refinancing operations and other central bank operations. Because the exclusion of these 
high-risk assets would reduce the total amount of pledgeable collateral, thereby adversely 
affecting the access of financial institutions to liquidity, it is essential to replace them in the 
collateral framework with environmentally-friendly assets.  
Furthermore, central banks could require commercial banks to pledge a pool of collateral 
aligned with sustainability objectives, while leaving banks free to choose the composition of 
this pool. The development of climate-aligned collateral frameworks could, for example, 
build on the work by Dafermos et al. (2020c), who present two practical approaches for 
the adjustment of haircuts and exclusion or inclusion of assets based on sustainability 
assessments for the Eurosystem. First, under a climate footprint approach, the collateral 
framework could be adjusted based on the climate footprint of the bond issuers. Secondly, 
their climate risk approach envisions the framework to accommodate the expected 
default rates of the bond issuers under different transition scenarios.   
To date, 55 central banks have adapted and expanded their collateral frameworks as part 
of their policy response to the COVID-19 crisis. While changes to collateral frameworks were 
largely deemed off limits prior to the crisis, this shows that central banks are capable and 
willing to change their frameworks in response to emergencies and crises. Furthermore, this 
provides an indication of the policy space that central banks have to adapt their collateral 
frameworks, should climate change and the need to achieve a sustainable transition be 
considered an emergency. 
2. Asset purchase programmes, crisis facilities and refinancing operations  
Central banks could better align their asset purchases with the goals of the Paris 
Agreement. As shown by research, efforts to apply the market-neutrality principle to 
corporate APPs can lead to a significant carbon bias and hence have strong negative 




practice this is the case when carbon emission-intensive sectors are over-represented on 
the list of APP-eligible bonds despite a relatively lower contribution to employment and 
gross value added in an otherwise market-neutral portfolio. For example, central banks 
could decrease the share of assets exposed to climate-related transition risks in their 
corporate debt purchases. This option would align their asset purchases with environmental 
objectives, but also reduce their own exposure to climate risks.  
The corporate bond purchase programmes that have been implemented by central banks 
in response to the pandemic continue to be biased towards carbon-intensive sectors 
(Dafermos et al., 2020a, 2020b), which has been a well-known issue of the past 
programmes of the ECB and Bank of England. A particular concern in this regard is that a 
bias towards carbon-intensive industries improves financing conditions for these sectors, 
while simultaneously failing to adequately reflect climate change-related and other 
environmental risks of the purchased assets. A proposal for the decarbonisation of the Bank 
of England’s asset purchase programme has been presented by Dafermos et al. (2020a), 
who are proposing two options. First, under a lower-carbon pandemic quantitative easing 
(QE) scenario, bonds issued by the most carbon-intensive sectors would be excluded from 
the programme and replaced with bonds that are connected to more sustainable 
economic activities. Secondly, under a low-carbon pandemic QE scenario, Dafermos et al. 
propose to eliminate the vast majority of bonds issued by all carbon-intensive sectors and 
to replace these bonds issued by sectors that are not carbon-intensive. 
Central bank governors have increasingly discussed the possibility of aligning asset 
purchase programmes with the sustainability objectives of their governments. The Bank of 
England’s Governor Andrew Bailey has voiced support for aligning the Bank’s corporate 
bond purchase scheme with the Government’s climate goals (Reuters, 2020). However, in 
the context of the Bank of England’s crisis response lending programme, Bailey has also 
defended the position to not incorporate a test based on climate considerations that 
would enable a sustainability-enhanced calibration (Bailey, 2020). 
ECB president Christine Lagarde has discussed calibrating the ECB’s €2.8tn asset purchase 
scheme to pursue green objectives (Khalaf and Arnold, 2020). By 23 October, the ECB held 
assets worth €616,856 million in its €750 billion pandemic emergency purchase programme 
(PEPP) – all without explicitly considering a sustainability-enhanced calibration of its 
collateral framework. Furthermore, the calibration of a ‘market neutral’ corporate APP 
could potentially impede efforts to achieve an economic transition towards climate-
neutrality when pervasive market failures in current markets lead to a suboptimal allocation 
of resources towards transition industries and sustainable sectors of the economy.6 While 
the ECB has announced intentions to accept sustainability-linked bonds as collateral from 1 
January 2021 (ECB, 2020b), these measures will come too late to affect the first round of 
monetary crisis response policy. 
Central banks’ refinancing operations and crisis facilities could be conditioned on 
borrowers’ alignment with sustainability goals (see, e.g., van ’t Klooster and van Tilburg, 
2020). Several central banks have introduced refinancing and related policy initiatives as 
crisis response measures that are targeting specific sectors or asset classes.7 These initiatives 
could be calibrated in a sustainability-enhancing way. For example, it should be ensured 
that no unreasonable investment in assets that carry high transition risks and that could be 
stranded in the future are conducted. This would support a sustainable recovery through 
the greening of the financial system while mitigating the exposure to climate change-
related and other environmental risks. Furthermore, some central banks, notably the 
                                                            
6  In the context of ‘market neutrality principle’-based construction of the ECB’s asset purchase programme and the ensuing carbon bias, 
Dafermos et al. (2020b) propose two strategies for how carbon-intensive bonds could be replaced with more climate-friendly bonds. 
7  The Appendix outlines several examples of targeted refinancing operations that are employed to support specified sectors, most notably 




People’s Bank of China and the Banco Central do Brasil, are engaging in, or have 
announced plans for, ‘green’ refinancing operations. These operations offer a valuable 
starting point and should be extended to central banks’ crisis response operations. 
3. Prudential measures 
In contrast to the Financial Crisis of 2008, the current crisis can be understood as exogenous 
and not as the result of the unravelling of previous financial imbalances. Furthermore, this 
time the shock found banks in a strong financial position and policymakers have 
recognised banks and the financial system as part of the solution rather than as part of the 
problem (Borio, 2020). Supervisors did not tighten their policy stance and instead released 
prudential restrictions to encourage a sustained flow of credit to the economy. 
However, climate change and related risks are in no way less threatening for financial 
stability. In response to the current expansionary liquidity provision measures and the 
release of countercyclical regulatory and supervisory instruments, it is necessary to adjust 
prudential measures to avoid a manifestation of transition risks on the balance sheets of 
financial institutions. Financial supervisors and regulators have been quick to release either 
micro- or macroprudential requirements or expectations. Announcing environmental 
disclosure requirements and stress testing for 2021 is a first step that would limit immediate 
regulatory burdens on financial institutions, but would signal the necessity to account for 
potential exposure to climate risks added through lending and investment decisions in the 
current crisis phase.  
The importance of moving from voluntary to mandatory environmental reporting is also 
highlighted by the need to generate the information base to effectively assess default 
probabilities (for mortgages, for example) and to calibrate prudential instruments 
accordingly. Progress is being made with the adoption of the recommendations of the Task 
Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), but comprehensive reporting is still 
rare. A priority for supervisors is to ensure effective disclosure to regulated financial 
institutions, notably banks, insurers, investment institutions and capital market intermediaries 
(such as exchanges and rating agencies).  
Supervisors should also announce their intention to calibrate risk weights for climate-risks 
exposures and work towards an adoption of such an approach globally through the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. Furthermore, where prudential instruments such as 
capital requirements are eased, there should be exploration of how the persistent exposure 
of certain assets classes to climate risks, and transition risks in particular, can be taken into 
account. 
4. Management of central bank portfolios 
Last but not least, and as outlined by the NGFS (2019), central banks should adopt 
sustainable and responsible investment principles for portfolio management, including 
policy portfolios, such as the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), and commit to 
following the TCFD recommendations. They should also integrate climate risk metrics in 
portfolio risk managements, to better control for the exposure of their assets to such risks. 
The Bank of England has taken a first significant step in this direction by issuing a climate 
disclosure report, indicating that it is falling short of the terms of the Paris Agreement (Bank 
of England, 2020). The Bank of England’s climate-related financial disclosure indicates that 
parts of its investment portfolio currently support an average temperature increase of 3.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels by 2100. In disclosing its own approach to climate risk 
management for all its operations for the first time, the Bank of England is playing an 
important signalling role for the broader financial system. However, it also indicates the 




with the Paris agreement goals, requiring an internationally coordinated material reduction 
of carbon emissions. 
The COVID-19 crisis should not deter the resolve of central banks and supervisors to 
integrate sustainability and climate risks into financial decision-making. Rather, the 
pandemic crisis illustrates the need to strengthen the resilience of our economies and 
societies, and this requires financial markets to better mitigate climate and other 
sustainability risks. The current crisis, which has prompted radical changes of long-
established policy practices, also offers a window to include and address climate risks in 
these new-found approaches. Central banks and supervisors must ensure that they do 
whatever they can, within their mandate, to align their own COVID-19 crisis responses and 
decision-making in the financial sector with long-term sustainability goals to help the world 





5. The next phase of crisis response 
Over the course of 2020, central banks have responded at unprecedented scale and 
supervisors have relaxed prudential regulations and supervisory expectations across the 
board. This has led to a significant expansion of liquidity, credit and investment without the 
incorporation of sustainability considerations or the explicit alignment with climate neutrality 
goals.  
The crisis is not over yet. As central banks and supervisors extend existing measures or 
implement new follow-up crisis response measures, it remains urgent to incorporate 
sustainability considerations into measures aimed at easing lending conditions, as well as to 
take environmental- and climate-related risks in prudential release efforts into account, to 
avoid lock-in to a high-carbon recovery.  
Understandably, central banks’ and supervisors’ capacity to incorporate sustainability 
considerations and account for climate risks in their immediate crisis response has been 
limited. For the time being, data, knowledge and classification gaps are also obstacles that 
prevent policymakers from feeling comfortable with integrating sustainability and climate 
risks considerations on an ad hoc basis into conventional large-scale policy initiatives, such 
as APPs, collateral framework expansions or the countercyclical release of capital 
requirements. 
Bringing together crisis response and sustainability 
It is now important to bring together the two largely separate tracks of crisis response and 
sustainability commitments. Steps and considerations include the following: 
• Regarding policy aimed at easing lending conditions and expanding credit, it is 
urgent that sustainability considerations are incorporated, to avoid a significant 
expansion of lending to economic sectors and companies whose business model is 
not aligned with ambitious transition scenarios and under which this would constitute 
a significant investment in essentially stranded assets. 
• Closely related to the previous point, the widespread and undifferentiated 
countercyclical release of regulation and supervisory expectations in face of 
significant transition (and physical) risks is problematic. If prudential measures are 
released, assets and related exposure to sectors bearing the highest transitions risks 
should be exempt. 
• Since the beginning of the year, the NGFS as well as national central banks and 
supervisors have made significant progress in expanding their capacity and 
knowledge on climate change and related risks. This has been translated by many 
into announcements of future policy action. The implementation of these measures 
should be brought forward and be applied to all crisis response measures. The 
Toolbox (presented in Section 6 below) offers insights for where to start in the context 
of the global crisis policy response by central banks and supervisors (as outlined in 
Section 7). 
• Focus should be applied on practical and targeted calibration of monetary policy 
instruments (such as collateral frameworks, APPs and refinancing), identifying ‘no 
regrets’ measures that can be taken to start incorporating climate and sustainability 
factors rather than waiting for a fully comprehensive approach. 
• Finally, further dialogue and analysis is needed to explore how well-established 
approaches such as the market neutrality principle can be updated in light of 
market-failures such as climate change and biodiversity loss. In the case of the ECB, 




understanding of the market-neutral calibration of its asset portfolios, ECB President 
Christine Lagarde and Executive Board Member Isabel Schnabel have started to 
discuss whether, in face of pervasive market failures, market neutrality should remain 
the guiding principle for central banks’ policy portfolio management (Look 2020). 
Looking ahead, our future research will focus on providing more technical and regional 
specific detail on how priority tools could be deployed by central banks and supervisors 
as they support economies through the COVID crisis and simultaneously deepen their 






6. The Toolbox: Policy tools available to central 
banks and financial supervisors 
 Conventional (sustainability-blind) 
calibration 
Sustainability-enhanced calibration 
1. Monetary policy 
(1) Collateral 
frameworks 
• Collateral credit quality is assessed 
based on conventional methods, 
perpetuating exposure to and market 
mispricing of climate risks and carbon 
bias and maintaining financing 
conditions for industries not aligned with 
the Paris Agreement. 
• Collateral frameworks become carbon-
neutral, take climate- and other 
sustainability-related financial risks into 
account and apply haircuts8 to 
account for these risks. 
• Collateral frameworks exclude asset 
classes that are not aligned with 
sustainability goals such as the Paris 
Agreement.9 
(2) Indirect monetary 
policy instruments 
• Standard instruments such as open 
market operations, standing facilities, 
reserve requirements and refinancing 
operations are calibrated without 
sustainability considerations, leading to 
a potential carbon bias. 
• Align refinancing operations with 
sustainability goals such as the Paris 
Agreement.10 
• Differentiated reserve requirements, risk 
weights, accounting for carbon 
footprint, climate-related financial risk 
(particularly transition risks),11 or other 
sustainability factors. 




• Asset purchase programmes (APPs) 
ignore climate- and other sustainability-
related financial risks, perpetuating 
financial markets’ exposure to climate 
risks and carbon bias.12 
• Direct (short-term) credit to the 
government to support standard fiscal 
spending. 
• Helicopter money without 
conditionality. 
• APPs exclude carbon-intensive assets.13  
• Direct (short-term) credit to the 
government to support sustainable/ 
Paris-aligned fiscal policies.14 
• Purchase of green sovereign bonds 
• Helicopter money conditioned on 
sustainable/Paris-aligned spending. 
  
                                                            
8  Further research is needed to provide a framework for the calculation and application of these haircuts, building on the application of an 
appropriate risk assessment methodology. 
9  Monnin (2020) stresses the shortcomings of the risk metrics to sufficiently reflect climate financial risks used by central banks to assess whether 
securities are eligible as collateral. He proposes to (i) supplement the external risk assessments with existing climate risk analytics; (ii) integrate 
climate risk analysis in their in-house risk assessments; (iii) to only accept assessments provided by rating agencies that adequately account 
for climate financial risks; and (iv) accept counterparties’ risk assessments conditional on these counterparties’ climate financial risk 
assessments. For more on the greening of collateral frameworks in the context of the Eurosystem Collateral Framework, see Schoenmaker 
(2019). 
10  Building on collateral framework adjustments, this could be operationalised through the exclusion of highly polluting and carbon-intensive 
assets eligible under different refinancing programmes. Alternatively, additional haircuts or differentiated interest rates could be used to 
account for higher climate-related risks and to disincentivise non-Paris alignment. In the European context, this could include the greening of 
the targeted longer-term refinancing operations. 
11  The incorporation of physical risks could also have adverse side effects for countries vulnerable to climate change (Buhr et al., 2018). 
12  See Matikainen et al. (2017). 
13  In order to maintain the same total value of purchases and to replace excluded assets, it could be necessary to ease some of the standard 
assessment criteria of eligible assets. 
14  The Fed’s municipal bond purchases under its Municipal Liquidity Facility are of particular interest in this context as they could potentially 




(4) Direct monetary 
policy instruments15 
• Direct controls on interest rates (e.g. 
minimum and maximum interest rates, 
preferential rates for certain loan 
categories). 
• Credit ceilings (at aggregate level or 
on individual banks). 
• Directed lending policies (e.g. 
preferential central bank refinance 
facilities to direct credit to priority 
sectors). 
• Window guidance/moral suasion to 
promote priority sectors. 
• Credit interest rate ceilings for 
sustainable priority sectors, asset 
classes, and firms. 
• Minimum/maximum allocation of credit 
through credit ceilings or quotas to 
restrict/promote lending to carbon-
intensive/sustainable sectors. 
• Targeted refinancing lines to promote 
credit for sustainable sectors. 
• Window guidance/moral suasion to 
promote lending to sustainable 
sectors.16 
2. Prudential policy: Regulation and supervision 
(5) Microprudential 
instruments 
• Conventional stress testing / excessive 
delay of climate-stress testing. 
• No disclosure requirements for climate-
related financial risks. 
• Standard supervisory review process 
(SRP). 
• Conventional calibration of other Basel 
III instruments. 
• Stress testing frameworks that 
acknowledge climate and other 
sustainability risks and help firms take 
into account longer-term risks.17 
• Mandatory disclosure requirements for 
climate-related financial risks or other 
sustainability risks. 
• Supervisory review process (SRP) that 
highlights management of climate-
related financial risks or other 
sustainability risks. 
• Climate risk-sensitive calibration of other 
Basel III instruments, distinguishing 
between low-carbon and carbon-
intensive/high-exposure assets to create 
buffers against climate-related losses 
(e.g. differential risk-based capital 
requirements, lower required stable 
funding factor for green loans). 
(6) Macroprudential 
instruments 
• Conventional system-wide stress testing. 
• Calibration of instruments along the 
cyclical dimension without explicit 
acknowledgement of climate-related 
financial risks.  
• Calibration of instruments along the 
cross-sectional dimension without 
explicit acknowledgement of climate-
related financial risks. 
• System-wide stress testing that 
acknowledges and assesses systemic 
climate-related financial risks (see 
Battiston et al., 2017). 
• Cyclical instruments calibrated to 
account for and mitigate systemic risk 
implications of climate change and 
restrain the build-up of risk-taking during 
the recovery/expansion phase (e.g. 
countercyclical and higher capital 
buffer in order to protect the financial 
sector from periods of excessive 
carbon-intensive credit growth, LVRs 
and loan-to-income ratios to limit the 
extension of credit by banks to carbon-
intensive industries and investment in 
non-sustainable asset classes).18  
                                                            
15  Direct instruments, which are mostly relevant in the emerging market and developing economy context where underdeveloped financial 
markets permit the effective employment of indirect instruments, operate by setting or limiting either prices or quantities through regulations 
and may also be used to allocate credit. Furthermore, it is important to note that the calibration of many central banking and supervisory 
instruments can have intended or unintended consequences for the allocation of credit. 
16  Window guidance, also known as moral suasion, has been used in the past by the BOJ and the PBOC to influence the quantity and quality of 
credit. The PBOC has, until recently, used window guidance to promote sustainable finance. See Dikau and Volz (2020). 
17  Stress-testing frameworks that include both ‘conventional’ stress tests that are applied to climate tail risks over a shorter period to assess 
capital adequacy, and the development of stress tests to account for longer-term risks that can have other prescriptive outcomes. 





• Cross-sectional instruments calibrated 
to account for and mitigate systemic 
risk implications of climate change and 
to mitigate individual institutions’ 
contribution to systemic risk (e.g. large 
exposure restrictions to limit financial 
institutions’ exposure to highly carbon-
intensive assets, capital surcharges for 
systemically important financial 
institutions and institutions with high 
exposure to carbon-intensive assets). 
3. Other policies 
(7) Further financing 
schemes and other 
initiatives 
• Corporate financing facilities or loan 
guarantees without climate or 
sustainability conditionality. 
• Financial sector bailouts without 
climate or sustainability conditionality. 
• Corporate financing facilities or loan 
guarantees subject to reduction of CO2 
emissions or sustainability enhancing 
activities. 
• Incorporation of sustainability 
considerations into bailout packages in 
case of partial or full nationalisation of 
financial institutions. 
• Funding sustainable lending/investment 
schemes by public banks and 
development finance institutions (e.g. 
for renewable energy or retrofitting of 
buildings) through refinancing credit 
lines or purchase of bonds under APPs 
in secondary market or direct 
refinancing operations. 
• Tailoring of supervisory frameworks for 
development banks to enhance their 
public policy capacity to bear risk, 
promote economic transformation. 
(8) Management of 
central bank 
portfolios 
• Management of central bank portfolios 
without consideration of climate 
change and other sustainability risks. 
• Disclosure of climate-related financial 
risks in own portfolios (e.g. following the 
TCFD recommendations) (see NGFS, 
2019 and Fender et al., 2019). 
• Adopting sustainable and responsible 
investment principles for portfolio 
management (e.g. PRI). 
(9) Supporting 
sustainable finance 
• No new sustainable finance initiatives 
launched, ongoing efforts are 
postponed or halted. 
• Sustainable finance roadmaps/ 
guidance for financial institutions. 
• Advice and dialogue with other parts of 
the government. 
• Research and publication of 
handbooks and resources (e.g. 
reference scenarios, risk assessment 
methodologies). 
• Capacity building programmes in 
sustainable finance for the financial 
sector, convening role of central banks. 
Source: Compiled by authors drawing on Dikau and Volz (2019, 2020a), Dikau et al. (2019) and Schoenmaker 




7. Policy tools used by central banks and financial 
supervisors in 188 countries during the COVID-19 
pandemic (as of 5 October 2020) 
1. Monetary policy19 
(1) Collateral 
frameworks 
• Algeria – Banque d’Algérie (BDA): Lowered haircuts on government securities used 
in refinancing operations.  
• Australia – Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA): Broadened the range of eligible 
collateral for open market operations to include securities issued by non-bank 
corporations with an investment grade. 
• Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic 
of the Congo – Bank of Central African States (BEAC): Reduced haircuts 
applicable to private instruments accepted as collateral for refinancing 
operations. 
• Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire), Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, Togo – Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO): Extended the 
collateral framework to access central bank refinancing to include bank loans to 
prequalified 1,700 private companies.     
• Botswana – Bank of Botswana (BOB): Extended collateral constraints for banks to 
include corporate bonds and traded stocks.  
• Canada – Bank of Canada (BOC): Expanded the list of eligible collateral for term 
repo operations to the full range of eligible collateral for the standing liquidity 
facility, except the non-mortgage loan portfolio. 
• Chile – Banco Central de Chile (BCC): Included corporate securities as collateral 
for the Central Bank’s liquidity operations and included high-rated commercial 
loans as collateral for the funding facility operations.  
• Colombia – Banco de la Republica (BANREP): Expanded liquidity overnight and 
term facilities in terms of amounts, applicable securities and eligible counterparts.     
• Czech Republic – Czech National Bank (CNB): Expanded the types of securities 
and counterparties CNB can engage with in secondary markets in case of 
disorderly market conditions.   
• Dominican Republic – Banco Central Republica Dominicana (BCRD): Allowed 
banks to use public bonds towards reserve requirements on foreign currency 
deposits. 
• Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and Spain – European Central Bank (ECB)/European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB): Broadened the package of collateral easing measures for 
Eurosystem credit operations (e.g. expanded the scope of so-called additional 
credit claims framework so that it may also include public sector-guaranteed loans 
to SMEs, self-employed individuals, and households), expanded range of eligible 
assets under the corporate sector purchase programme, and relaxed collateral 
standards for Eurosystem refinancing operations.20 
• Hungary – Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB): Expanded eligible collateral. 
• Israel – Bank of Israel (BOIL): Expanded the acceptable collateral for repos to 
include corporate bonds rated AA or higher. 
• Italy – Banca d’Italia (BDI): Extended additional credit claim frameworks to include 
loans backed by COVID-19-related public sector guarantees in order to promote 
the use of credit claims as collateral and to incentivise lending to SMEs. 
• Jamaica – Bank of Jamaica (BOJM): Broadened the range of acceptable repo 
collateral.      
• Japan – Bank of Japan (BOJ): Expanded the range of eligible counterparties and 
collateral to private debt (including household debt).   
                                                            
19  Excluded in the table are policy interest rate changes, the expansion of repo facilities and swap arrangements, and instructions to defer the 
repayment of loans and employ flexibility to banks regarding loan classification. 




• Kazakhstan – National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK): Expanded the list of eligible 
collaterals. 
• Republic of Korea – Bank of Korea (BOK): Expanded of the list of eligible open 
market operations participants to include select non-bank financial institutions; 
expanded eligible open market operations collateral to include bank bonds, 
certain bonds from public enterprises and agencies, and government-guaranteed 
mortgage-backed securities issued by Korea Housing Finance Corporation; eased 
collateral requirements for net settlements in the BOK payments system. 
• Mexico – Banco de México (Banxico): Expanded liquidity facilities to accept a 
broader range of collateral and expanded list of eligible institutions. 
• Morocco – Bank Al-Maghrib (BKAM): Expanded the range of collateral accepted 
for repos and credit guarantees to include public and private debt instruments 
(including mortgages). 
• Serbia – National Bank of Serbia (NBSR): Made local-currency denominated 
corporate bonds eligible for open market operations and as collateral for banks. 
• Singapore – Monetary Authority Singapore (MAS): Wide range of collateral 
accepted under the new MAS SGD term facility; domestic systemically important 
banks also able to pledge eligible residential property loans as collateral at the 
term facility, expand range of collateral that banks can use to access US dolllar 
liquidity from the MAS USD facility. 
• Sweden – Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank): Eased rules for the use of covered bonds as 
collateral.       
• Tanzania – Bank of Tanzania (BOTZ): Reduced collateral haircuts requirements on 
government securities.         
• Turkey – Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası (TCMB): Broadened the pool of assets 
for use as collateral in TCMB transactions. 
• Ukraine – National Bank of Ukraine (NBU): Expanded list of eligible collateral that 
banks can use to obtain financing, incorporating municipal bonds and 
government-guaranteed corporate bonds; expanded the list of collateral eligible 
for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) facility; revised the haircuts for domestic 
government bonds pledged as collateral under refinancing loans, direct repo, IRS 
and transactions on cash storage agreements. 
(2) Indirect monetary 
policy instruments  
• Algeria – BDA: Lowered the reserve requirement ratio from 8 to 3 per cent and 
activated one month open market operations. 
• Aruba – Centrale Bank van Aruba (CBVA) Lowered the reserve requirement on 
commercial bank deposits from 12 to 7 per cent. 
• Botswana – BOB: Reduced the primary reserve requirement (PRR). 
• Brazil – Banco Central do Brasil (BCB): Reduced the reserve requirements and 
capital conservation buffers and temporarily relaxed provisioning rules; opened 
new facility to provide loans to financial institutions backed by private corporate 
bonds as collateral. 
• Cambodia – National Bank of Cambodia (NBC): Reduced reserve requirements for 
banking and financial institutions. 
• Cabo Verde – Banco de Cabo Verde (BCV): Reduced the minimum reserve 
requirement and set up a long-term lending instrument for banks. 
• Chile – BCC: Introduced new funding facility for banks conditional on banks to 
increase credit. 
• China – People’s Bank of China (PBC): Injected RMB 3.33 trillion (gross) liquidity into 
the banking system via open market operations (reverse repos and medium-term 
lending facilities). 
• Colombia – BANREP: Lowered the reserve requirement applicable to savings and 
checking accounts. 
• Comoros – Banque Central des Comoros (BCCKM): Reduced reserve requirements 
to 10 per cent. 
• Croatia – Croatian National Bank (HNB): Reduced the reserve requirement ratio 
from 12 to 9 per cent. 
• Democratic Republic of the Congo – Banque Centrale du Congo (BCCD): 
Eliminated mandatory reserve requirements on demand deposits in local currency.      
• Denmark – Danmarks Nationalbank (DN): Launched an ‘extraordinary lending 
facility’ which will make full-allotment, 1-week, collateralised loans available to 
banks at -0.5 per cent interest rate. 
• Dominican Republic – BCRD: Reduced the reserve requirement rate. 
• El Salvador – Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador (BCR): Reduced the reserve 
requirements. 




• Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and Spain – ECB/ESCB: Temporary additional auctions of the full-
allotment, fixed rate temporary liquidity facility at the deposit facility rate and 
more favourable terms on existing targeted longer-term refinancing operations; 
introduced a  new liquidity facility, which consists of a series of non-targeted 
Pandemic Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing Operations carried out with an 
interest rate that is 25bp below the average main refinancing operations rate 
prevailing over the life of the operation. 
• The Gambia – Central Bank of the Gambia (CBG): Reduced the reserve 
requirement from 15 to 13 per cent. 
• Germany – Bundesbank: Introduced additional €100 billion to refinance expanded 
short-term liquidity provision to companies through the public development bank 
KfW, in partnership with commercial banks. 
• Ghana – Bank of Ghana (BOG): reduced the primary reserve requirement from 10 
to 8 per cent. 
• Guinea – Banque Centrale de la Republique de Guinea (BCRG): reduced the 
reserve requirement ratios from 16 to 15 per cent. 
• Guyana – Bank of Guyana (BOGY): Reduced reserve requirements from 12 to 10 
per cent. 
• Haiti – Banque de la Républic d’Haiti (BRH): Reduced the reserve requirements.  
• Honduras – Banco Central de Honduras (BCH): Reduced reserve requirements 
from 12 to 9 per cent.  
• Hong Kong – Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA): Cut regulatory reserves by 
half to increase banks’ lending capacity. 
• Hungary – MNB: Introduced a long-term unlimited collateralised lending facility; 
suspension of penalties for unmet reserve requirements. 
• Indonesia – Bank Indonesia (BI): Reduced the reserve requirement ratios for banks 
• Iraq – Central Bank of Iraq (CBIQ): Reduced the reserve requirement from 15 to 13 
per cent. 
• Jordan – Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ): Reduced the compulsory reserve ratio on 
deposits from 7 to 5 per cent. 
• Republic of Korea – BOK: Provided unlimited amounts through open market 
operations, expansion of BOK repo operations to non-banks, creation of a BOK 
lending programme to non-banks with corporate bonds as collateral. 
• Kyrgyz Republic – Nation Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR): Reduced mandatory 
reserve requirements. 
• Lao People's Democratic Republic – Bank of Lao (BOL): Reduced the reserve 
requirements. 
• Malawi – Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM): Reduced the liquidity reserve 
requirement. 
• Malaysia – Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM): Lowered the Statutory Reserve 
Requirement Ratio from 3 to 2 per cent. 
• Maldives – Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA): Reduced the minimum reserves 
requirement. 
• Mauritania – Banque Centrale de Mauritania (BCMr): Reduced the reserve 
requirements. 
• Mexico – Banxico: Reduced the mandatory regulatory deposit with Banxico, in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Finance, seeking to strengthen market making in 
the government bond market; opened a facility to repurchase government 
securities at longer maturities than those of regular open market operations for up 
to 100 billion pesos. The cost of the repos was reduced significantly and a debt 
securities temporary swap facility was introduced to promote orderly debt markets 
and provide liquidity for trading instruments; established a corporate securities 
repo facility to support the corporate bond market. 
• Moldova – National Bank of Moldova (BNMD): Reduced the reserve requirement 
ratio. 
• Mongolia – Mongalbank: Reduced reserve requirements. 
• Montenegro – Central bank of Montenegro (CBCG): Reduced the reserve 
requirement rate. 
• Mozambique – Banco de Moçambique (BANCOMOC): Reduced the reserve 
requirement requirements on domestic and foreign currency deposits. 
• Myanmar – Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM): Reduced the reserve requirement 
ratio. 




• New Zealand – Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ): Introduced Term Auction 
Facility allowing banks access to collateralised loans of up to 12 months, and a 
corporate facility in which the RBNZ offered up to NZ$500 million per week in open 
market operations with banks against corporate paper and asset-backed 
securities; introduced Term Lending Facility, a longer-term funding scheme for 
banks at 0.25 per cent. 
• Nicaragua – Central Bank of Nicaragua (CBN): Reduced the reserve requirement 
in domestic currency deposits. 
• North Macedonia – National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia (NBRM): 
Reduced the base for the reserve requirement by the amount of new loans to firms 
in affected sectors. 
• Norway – Norges Bank (NB): Provisioned additional liquidity to banks in form of 
loans of differing maturities. 
• Papua New Guinea – Bank of Papua New Guinea (BPNG): Reduced the cash 
reserve requirement. 
• Paraguay – Banco Central del Paraguay (BCP): Reduced the minimum reserve 
requirements on domestic and foreign currency deposits. 
• Peru – Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (BCRP): Reduced the reserve 
requirements. 
• Philippines – Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Reduced the reserve requirement 
ratio for commercial banks. 
• Poland – National Bank of Poland (NBP): Reduced the required reserve ratio. 
• Russian Federation – Central Bank of Russia (CBR): Introduced long-term 
refinancing instrument (long-term repos are planned for one month and one year). 
• Rwanda – National Bank of Rwanda (NBR): Purchased Treasury bond through the 
rediscount window until September; lowered the reserve requirement ratio. 
• São Tomé and Príncipe – Central Bank of São Tomé (BCSTP): Reduced the policy 
rate and minimum cash reserve requirement. 
• Seychelles – Central Bank of Seychelles (CBS): Reduced the Minimum Reserve 
Requirement (MRR) on Rupee deposits from 13 to 10 per cent.  
• Sierra Leone – Bank of Sierra Leone (BSL): Extended the reserve requirement 
maintenance period. 
• Solomon Islands – Central Bank of Solomon Islands (CBSI): Reduced the cash 
reserve requirements. 
• South Africa – South African Reserve Bank (SARB): Reduced the upper and lower 
limits of the standing facility; and raised the size of the main weekly refinancing 
operations as needed. Programme aimed to purchase government securities in 
the secondary market across the entire yield curve and extend the main 
refinancing instrument maturities. 
• Republic of South Sudan – Bank of South Sudan (BSS): Reduced the reserve 
requirement ratio. 
• Sri Lanka – Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL): Reduced the reserves requirement 
ratio. 
• Suriname – Central Bank van Suriname (CBVS): Reduced the reserve requirement 
from 35 to 27.5 per cent. 
• Sweden – Riksbank: Announced lending of up to SEK 500 billion to companies via 
banks; introduced a new lending facility whereby banks can borrow unlimited 
amounts (given adequate collateral) with 3-month and 6-month maturity. 
• Switzerland – Swiss National Bank (SNB): Introduced COVID-19 refinancing facility to 
operate in conjunction with the federal government’s guarantees for corporate 
loans, allowing banks to obtain liquidity from the SNB. 
• Tajikistan – National Bank of Tajikistan (NBT): Reduced the reserve requirement.   
• Tanzania – BOTZ: Reduced the minimum reserve requirement from 7 to 6 per cent. 
• Trinidad and Tobago – Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT): Reduced the 
reserve requirement from 17 to 14 per cent. 
• Turkey – TCMB: Reduced the reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits; 
raised the reserve requirement ratios for all types and maturities of foreign 
exchange liabilities. 
• Ukraine – NBU: Modified the calculation of reserve requirements. 
• United Arab Emirates – Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates (CBUAE): Halved 
banks’ required reserve requirements from 14 to 7 per cent; introduced zero-
interest rate collateralised loans to banks (AED 50 billion). 
• United Kingdom – Bank of England (BoE): Activated a Contingent Term Repo 




• United States – Federal Reserve System (Fed): Purchased Treasury and agency 
securities in the amount as needed. Expanded overnight and term repos. Lowered 
cost of discount window lending. 
• Uruguay – Banco Central Del Uruguay (BCU): Reduced the reserve requirements.                




• Bolivia – Banco Central de Bolivia (BCBO): Purchased bonds from pension funds. 
• Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic 
of the Congo – BEAC: Introduced a new programme of government securities 
purchases with the possibility of extension until July 2021. 
• Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo – 
BCEAO: Introduced measures to promote the use of electronic payments; issued 
special 3-month refinancing window at a fixed rate of 2.5 per cent for limited 
amounts of 3-month ‘Covid-19 T-Bills’ by each West African Economic and 
Monetary Union sovereign to help meet funding needs related to the current 
pandemic. When the Covid-19 T-Bills matured in August, new 3-months T-Bills issued 
which banks may refinance with the BCEAO for their term to maturity at 2 per cent.  
o Benin allowed to issue the equivalent of 1.5 per cent of GDP 
o Burkina Faso allowed to issue the equivalent of 0.5 per cent of GDP 
o Côte d’Ivoire allowed to issue the equivalent of 0.6 per cent of GDP 
o Guinea-Bissau allowed to issue the equivalent of 1.2 per cent of GDP 
o Mali allowed to issue the equivalent of 0.5 per cent of GDP 
o Niger allowed to issue the equivalent of 1.3 per cent of GDP 
o Senegal allowed to issue the equivalent of 0.7 per cent of GDP 
o Togo allowed to issue the equivalent of 2.1 per cent of GDP 
• Canada – BOC: Extended the bond buyback programme across all maturities; 
supported the Canada Mortgage Bond (CMB) market by purchasing CMBs in the 
secondary market; launched the Bankers’ Acceptance Purchase Facility; 
announced the Provincial Money Market Purchase programme, the Provincial 
Bond Purchase Programme, the Commercial Paper Purchase Programme, the 
Corporate Bond Purchase Programme, and the purchase of Government of 
Canada securities in the secondary market. 
• Chile – BCC: Introduced bank bonds purchase programme (up to US$8 billion). 
Later introduced additional measures to support liquidity and credit through an 
additional funding-for-lending facility in the total amount of US$16 billion effective 
for eight months and a special asset purchase programme in the total amount of 
US$8 billion over a 6-month period.  
• Colombia – BANREP: Introduced programme to purchase securities issued by 
credit institutions and treasury purchases in the secondary market.   
• Costa Rica – Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR): Purchased government 
securities in the secondary market to provide liquidity during market distress. 
• Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and Spain – ECB/ESCB: Permitted additional asset purchases of €120 
billion under the asset purchase programme and introduced €750 billion asset 
purchase programme of private and public sector securities (Pandemic 
Emergency Purchase Programme, PEPP). Later expanded the size of the PEPP by 
€600 billion to €1.35 trillion. 
• Egypt – Central Bank of Egypt (CBEG): Launched an EGP 20 billion stock-purchase 
programme. 
• Fiji – RBF: Purchased FJ$280 million of Government bonds in the first half of 2020 to 
help finance the Government deficit.     
• Finland – Bank of Finland (BOF): Provided support to liquidity through investing in 
short-term Finnish corporate commercial paper (€1 billion). 
• The Gambia – CBG: Used GMD 855 million of retained earnings to increase 
statutory capital and pay some of the central government liabilities to the Central 
Bank. 
• Ghana – BOG: Introduced a new bond purchasing programme to provide 
emergency financing to the government in light of a higher projected fiscal 
financing gap. 
• Guatemala – Banco de Guatemala (GOB): Announced plans to purchase GTM 
Treasury Bonds for up to GTQ11 billion (about US$1.5 billion).  
• Hungary – MNB: Launched a quantitative easing programme consisting of buying 
government securities on the secondary market, and re-started the mortgage 




• India – Reserve Bank of India (RBI): Created a facility to help with state 
government’s short-term liquidity needs; relaxed export repatriation limits; 
increased the state’s Ways and Means Advance limits by 60 per cent. 
• Indonesia – BI: Given authority to purchase government bonds in the primary 
market as a last resort. This scheme covered: purchases of government bonds with 
coupons at the BI’s policy rate to finance priority spending on public goods such 
as health and social protection; subsidised by BI transfers to the budget the 
budgetary interest cost of spending support to firms; acted as buyer of last resort 
for long-term local-currency bonds to finance other spending. The government 
issued the first bond under the burden sharing scheme on 6 August. BI provided 
funding to Indonesian Deposit Insurance Corporation (LPS) through repo 
transactions and purchases of government bonds owned by LPS.       
• Israel – BOIL: Announced government bond purchases up to NIS50 billion (NIS 23.4 
billion as of end-June); launched plan to purchase corporate bonds on the 
secondary market for up to NIS 15 billion. 
• Japan – BOJ: Targeted liquidity provision through an increase in the size and 
frequency of Japanese government bond (JGB) purchases, special funds-
supplying operation to provide loans to financial institutions to facilitate financing 
of corporates, a temporary increase in the annual pace of BOJ’s purchases of 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and Japan-Real Estate Investment Trusts (J-REITs), 
and a temporary additional increase of targeted purchases of commercial paper 
and corporate bonds.   
• Republic of Korea – BOK: Purchased Korean Treasury Bonds (KRW 3.0 trillion). 
• Mauritius – BOM: Introduced one-off exceptional contribution of Rs60 billion (12 per 
cent GDP) for the purpose of assisting government in its fiscal measures. 
• New Zealand – RBNZ: Near doubled the Large-Scale Asset Purchase programme 
(LSAP) to purchase up to NZ$60 billion of government bonds and Local 
Government Funding Agency (LGFA) bonds in the secondary market over the next 
12 months, adding NZ$3 billion (equivalent to 30 per cent on issue) of LGFA debt to 
the LSAP, doubling the overdraft on the crown settlement account to NZ$10 billion 
for April to June to meet the government’s short-term cash needs. 
• Papua New Guinea – BPNG: Repurchased government securities in an open 
market quantitative easing programme. 
• Philippines – BSP: Purchased PHP 300 billion worth government securities (about 1.5 
per cent of 2019 GDP) through a repurchase agreement with the government, 
made secondary market purchases of government securities, and remitted PHP 20 
billion as dividend to the government. 
• Poland – NBP: Purchased Polish Treasury securities in the secondary market and 
expanded eligible securities to include those guaranteed by the State Treasury. 
• Romania – Banka Nationala a Romaniei (BNRO): Purchased government securities 
on the secondary market. 
• Seychelles – CBS: provided credit to government limited up to SCR 500 million       
• Solomon Islands – CBSI: Plans to buy government bonds in the secondary market 
as part of its stimulus measures. 
• Sweden – Riksbank: Increased purchases of securities of up to SEK 500 billion in 
2020 (where securities may include government and municipal bonds, covered 
bonds and securities issued by non-financial corporations). 
• Thailand – Bank of Thailand (BOT): Introduced Corporate Bond Stabilization Fund to 
provide bridge financing of up to THB 400 billion to high-quality firms with bonds 
maturing during 2020/21, at higher-than-market ‘penalty’ rates; purchased 
government bonds in excess of THB 100 billion in March to ensure the normal 
functioning of the government bond market; set up a special facility to provide 
liquidity for mutual funds through banks. 
• Turkey – TCMB: Increased purchases of sovereign bonds 
• Uganda – Bank of Uganda (BoU): Purchased Treasury Bonds held by microfinance 
deposit taking institutions and credit institutions to ease liquidity pressures. 
• United Kingdom – BoE: Expanded the central bank’s holding of UK government 
bonds and non-financial corporate bonds by £200 billion; HM Treasury and the BoE 
agreed to extend temporarily the use of the government’s overdraft account at 
the BoE to provide a short-term source of additional liquidity to the government if 
needed. 
• United States – Fed: Introduced Commercial Paper Funding Facility to facilitate the 
issuance of commercial paper by companies and municipal issuers; introduced 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility to provide financing to the Fed’s 24 primary dealers 




Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF) to provide loans to depository 
institutions to purchase assets from prime money market funds (covering highly 
rated asset backed commercial paper and municipal debt); introduced Primary 
Market Corporate Credit Facility to purchase new bonds and loans from 
companies; introduced Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility to provide 
liquidity for outstanding corporate bonds; introduced Term Asset-Backed Securities 
Loan Facility to enable the issuance of asset-backed securities backed by student 
loans, auto loans, credit-card loans, loans guaranteed by the Small Business 
Administration, and certain other assets; introduced Paycheck Protection 
Programme Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) to provide liquidity to financial institutions that 
originate loans under the Small Business Administration’s Paycheck Protection 
Programme (PPP) which provided a direct incentive to small businesses to keep 
their workers on the payroll; introduced Main Street Lending Programme to 
purchase new or expanded loans to SMEs; introduced Municipal Liquidity Facility 
to purchase short-term notes directly from state and eligible local governments.    
(4) Direct monetary 
policy instruments 
• Angola – Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA): Increased the minimum allocation 
required from banks to extend credit to producers of priority products and 
instructed banks to provide credit in local currency to assist importers of essential 
goods. 
• Argentina – Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA): Lowered reserve 
requirements on bank lending to households and SMEs; introduced regulations that 
limit banks’ holdings of central bank paper to provide space for SME lending; 
temporary easing of bank provisioning needs and of bank loan classification rules. 
• Australia – RBA: Established a Term Funding Facility (TFF) of at least A$90 billion for 
access to three-year funding at 25 basis points to allow banks to lend more to SMEs 
during the period of disruption caused by COVID-19. The TFF has since been 
expanded to A$200 billion and extended the access through June 2021.      
• Bangladesh – Bangladesh Bank (BB): Export Development Fund was raised to US$5 
billion, with the interest rate now fixed at 2 per cent and the refinancing limit 
increased; created several refinancing schemes amounting to a total of Tk380 
billion, a 360-day tenor special repo facility and a credit guarantee scheme to 
support exporters, farmers, SMEs and to facilitate the implementation of the 
government stimulus packages; announced an agriculture subsidy programme to 
further support farmers. 
• Bhutan – Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan (RMA): Converted the concessional 
working capital soft loans to tourism, manufacturing and wholesale business (April-
June 2020) to term loans for 4 years at 5 per cent rate; extended soft loans to 
cottage and small industries through the CSI Development Bank. 
• Chile – Comisión para el Mercado Financiero (CMFC): Introduced measures to 
facilitate the flow of credit to businesses and households, including special 
treatment in the establishment of provisions for deferred loans; adjusted the 
treatment of assets received as payment and margins in derivative transactions.   
• China – PBC: Expanded re-lending and re-discounting facilities by RMB1.8 trillion to 
support manufacturers of medical supplies and daily necessities, MSMEs and the 
agricultural sector at low interest rates; reduced targeted medium-term lending 
facility rate by 30 and 20 bps; targeted reserve requirement ratio cuts by 50–100 
bps for large- and medium-sized banks that meet inclusive financing criteria which 
benefit MSEs; an additional 100 bps for eligible joint-stock banks, and 100 bps for 
small- and medium-sized banks in April and May to support SMEs; expanded policy 
banks’ credit extension to private firms and MSEs (RMB 350 billion); introduced new 
instruments to support lending to MSEs, including a zero-interest ‘funding-for-
lending’ scheme (RMB 400 billion) to finance 40 per cent of local banks’ new 
unsecured loans. 
• Colombia – Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia (SFC): Introduced 
regulation prohibiting banks from increasing interest rates on loans, charging 
interest on interest, or reporting entities to credit registries for availing themselves of 
any forbearance measures. 
• Costa Rica – BCCR: Reduced the cost of credit, including through ¢900,000 million 
loans at preferential interest rates to firms across all sectors from state-owned 
banks.  
• Cyprus – Central Bank of Cyprus (CBCY): Encouraged banks to apply favourable 
interest rates for new loans and newly restructured loans. 
• Democratic Republic of the Congo – BCCD: Created a new collateralised long-




provision of new credit for the import and production of food and other basic 
goods. 
• Dominican Republic – BCRD: Capped the interest rate at 8.0 per cent for credit to 
households and businesses. Introduced a Rapid Liquidity Facility to provide funds 
for up to RD$60,000 million for productive sectors, consumption loans and SMEs. 
• Egypt – CBEG: Reduced the preferential interest rate from 10 to 8 per cent on 
loans to tourism, industry, agriculture and construction sectors, as well as for 
housing for low-income and middle-class families; announced a housing initiative 
to provide low-cost financing for housing units; announced a new lending initiative 
with soft loans at zero-to-low interest rates from banks aimed at replacing old cars 
with natural gas-powered vehicles; announced a government guarantee of EGP 3 
billion on low-interest loans by the central bank for the tourism industry soft loans; 
approved an EGP 100 billion guarantee to cover lending at preferential rates to 
the manufacturing, agriculture and contracting loans; made available loans with 
a two-year grace period for aviation sector firms; announced support for small 
projects harmed by COVID-19, especially in the industrial and labour-intensive 
sectors, through the availability of short-term loans of up to a year, to secure the 
necessary liquidity for operational expenses until the crisis is over. 
• Fiji – RBF: Raised the Import Substitution and Export Finance Facility by FJ$100 million 
to provide credit to exporters, large-scale commercial agricultural farmers, public 
transportation and renewable energy businesses at concessional rates; raised the 
Natural Disaster and Rehabilitation Facility to FJ$60 million to provide concessional 
loans to commercial banks for them to on-lend to businesses affected by COVID-
19. 
• France – Banque de France (BdF): Introduced credit mediation to support 
renegotiation of SMEs’ bank loans.   
• Georgia – National Bank of Georgia (NBG): Launched a new tool for liquidity 
management to support the financing of SMEs in Georgia, which consisted of two 
components: the first for commercial banks, which receive liquidity support from 
the NBG in exchange for mortgaging the loan portfolio; the second for micro-
financing organisations.        
• Guinea – Banque Centrale de la Republique de Guinea (BCRG): Permitted banks, 
for the duration of the pandemic, to count against their reserves credit provided to 
SMEs, businesses in the services sector affected (hotels, restaurants and transport), 
and major importers of food and pharmaceutical products. 
• Guyana – BOGY: Permitted commercial banks to provide short term financing for 
working capital at concessional rates of 5–6 per cent and reduce interest rates on 
consumer loans below G$10 million by 1–2 per cent until December 2020. 
• Hong Kong – HKMA: Introduced low-interest loans for SMEs with 100 per cent 
government guarantee (HK$ 70 billion). Enhanced the 80 and 90 per cent 
government guarantee products by raising the maximum loan amount and 
extending the eligibility coverage to listed firms. 
• Hungary – MNB: Introduced a new SME lending programme (FGS GO!) with interest 
rate subsidy. 
• India – RBI: Introduced measures to promote credit flows to the retail sector and 
MSMEs; the priority sector classification for bank loans to non-banking financial 
institutions has been extended for on-lending for FY 2020/21; special refinance 
facilities for rural banks, housing finance companies, and SMEs; credit support to 
the exporters and importers and extension of the tenor of the small business 
refinancing facilities; extended the benefit under interest subvention and prompt 
repayment incentive schemes for short-term agricultural loans. 
• Iran – Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran (CBI): Announced the allocation 
of funds to import medicine. 
• Iraq – CBIQ: Introduced a moratorium on interest and principal payments by SMEs 
through the directed lending initiative; offered 5 million Iraqi dinars (US$4,200) of 
additional support and reduced of the interest rates on loans extended through 
the ‘one trillion ID’ scheme. 
• Israel – BOIL: Introduced a term funding scheme amounting to NIS 5 billion to 
provide 3-year loans for banks to fund credit for MSEs. 
• Japan – BOJ: New fund-provisioning measure to support financing of mainly SMEs 
through the provision of funds against loans such as interest-free and unsecured 
loans made by eligible counterparties based on the government’s emergency 
economic measures. The total size of the special funds-supplying operation and 




• Jordan – CBJ: Expanded of the sectoral coverage and reduced interest rates on its 
refinancing programme. 
• Republic of Korea – BOK: Increased the ceiling of the Bank Intermediated Lending 
Support Facility by a total of KRW 5 trillion (about 0.26 per cent of GDP) and 
lowering the interest rate to 0.25 per cent (from 0.5–0.75 per cent) to augment 
available funding for SMEs. 
• Kuwait – Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK): Instructed banks to provide SMEs affected 
by the shock with financing at maximum of 2.5 per cent interest rate. 
• Lao People's Democratic Republic – BOL: Provisioned the availability of kin 200 
billion for low interest rate SMEs loans. 
• Latvia – Latvijas Banka (LVB): Introduced a 50 per cent cut in interest rates on loans 
for SMEs in the tourism sector and a 15 per cent cut for large enterprises. 
• Lebanon – Banque Du Liban (BDL): Allowed banks and financial institutions to 
extend exceptional 5-year, 0 per cent interest rate loans; in turn provide banks and 
financial institutions 5-year, 0 per cent interest rate credit lines. 
• Mauritius – BOM: Announced the Mauritius Investment Corporation Ltd (MIC) as a 
special purpose vehicle that will focus investment into the pharmaceutical and 
‘blue economy’ as new strategic sectors. 
• Mexico – Banxico: New financing facilities for commercial and development banks 
(350 billion pesos) to allow them to channel resources to MSMEs and individuals 
affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.  
• Mongolia – Mongalbank: Implemented state owned enterprise-issued bond 
purchases, short-term concessional financing to gold miners, and temporary 
resumption of the subsidised mortgage programme. 
• Morocco – BKAM: Suspended loan payments for SMEs and self-employed people; 
increasing and lengthening of central bank refinancing operations to support 
banking credit to SMEs. 
• Nepal – NRB: Increased the size of the Refinance Fund to provide subsidised 
funding for banks willing to lend at a concessional rate to priority sectors including 
SMEs; required banks to increase their loans from 25 to 40 per cent by 2024 to 
priority sectors, such as agriculture, energy, tourism and MSMEs. 
• Nigeria – Central Bank of Nigeria (CBNG): Created a N50 billion (US$139 million) 
targeted credit facility; introduced liquidity injection including N100 billion to 
support the health sector, N2 trillion to the manufacturing sector, and N1.5 trillion to 
the real sector to impacted industries.  
• Pakistan – State Bank of Pakistan (SBP): Expanded the scope of existing refinancing 
facilities and introduced three new refinancing facilities aimed at: supporting 
hospitals and medical centres; stimulating investment in new manufacturing plants 
and machinery, modernisation and expansion of existing projects; and 
incentivising businesses to avoid laying off their workers during the pandemic. Also, 
increased the regulatory limit on extension of credit to SMEs; introduced 
mandatory targets for banks to ensure loans to construction activities account for 
at least 5 per cent of the private sector portfolios by December 2021. 
• Paraguay – BCP: Created a National Emergency Special Credit Facility (FCE) to 
channel up to US$760 million in liquidity support to SMEs; allowed banks to 
automatically refinance loans to private sector companies that are in repayment 
difficulties. 
• Philippines – BSP: Allowed loans to MSMEs to be counted as part of banks’ 
compliance with reserve requirements, temporarily reduced their credit risk 
weights to 50 per cent, and assigned zero risk weight to loan exposures 
guaranteed by the Philippine Guarantee Corporation to encourage extension of 
loans to enterprises, particularly MSMEs; BSP increased the limit on banks’ real 
estate loan share from 20 per cent of their total loan portfolio (net of interbank 
loans) to 25 per cent. 
• Poland – NBP: Introduced programme to provide funding for bank lending to 
enterprises. 
• Russian Federation – CBR: Introduced RUB 500 billion facility for SME lending; 
reduced interest rate on CBR loans from 4.0 to 3.5 per cent to support lending to 
SMEs, including for urgent needs to support and maintain employment. Introduced 
an additional RUB 50 billion allocated for similar purposes to borrowers that do not 
have SME status. 
• Saudi Arabia – Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA): Announced a SAR 50 
billion (US$13.3 billion, 2 per cent of GDP) package to support the private sector, 




• Seychelles – CBS: Established a credit facility of SCR 500 million to assist commercial 
banks with emergency relief measures to support SMEs and another credit facility 
of SCR 750 million to support large enterprises. 
• Sierra Leone – BSL: Introduced a special credit facility of Le 500 billion to support 
production, procurement and distribution of essential goods. 
• Singapore – MAS: Introduced measures package to help individuals and SMEs 
facing temporary cashflow difficulties. The package has three components: help 
individuals meet their loan and insurance commitments; support SMEs with 
continued access to bank credit and insurance cover; and ensure interbank 
funding markets remain liquid and well-functioning. 
• Solomon Islands – CBSI: Introduced an export-import facility to assist businesses with 
opportunities for competitive financing. 
• Somalia – Central Bank of Somalia (CBSO): Released funding-for-lending support 
for SMEs through commercial banks. 
• Sri Lanka – CBSL: Provided refinancing and concessional lending facilities of 1 per 
cent of GDP for the tourism, garment, plantation and IT sectors, and SMEs. 
• Suriname – CBVS: Instructed banks to provide loans below market lending rates to 
persons or businesses affected by COVID-19. 
• Thailand – BOT: Introduced soft loans to financial institutions amounting to THB 500 
billion for on-lending at 2 per cent interest to SMEs with outstanding loans not 
classed as non-performing loans; Thai government covered the first six months of 
interest and guarantees up to 60–70 per cent of these loans. 
• Turkey – TCMB: Introduced a new lending facility for SMEs in the export sector; 
exporters’ inventory financing was supported by extending maturities for existing 
and new export rediscount credits; reallocated TL 20 billion of the TL 60 billion 
rediscount credit facility for exporters towards advance loans for investment in 
support strategic projects. 
• United Arab Emirates – CBUAE: Reduced provisioning for SME loans by 15–25; 
limited bank fees for SMEs.  
• United Kingdom – BoE: Introduced New Term Funding Scheme to reinforce the 
transmission of the rate cut, with additional incentives for lending to the real 
economy, and especially SMEs. 
• Vanuatu – Reserve Bank of Vanuatu (RBV): Reactivated the Bank’s Imports 
Substitution and Export Finance Facility (ISEFF) and the Disaster Reconstruction 
Credit Facility (DRCF). 
• Vietnam – State Bank of Vietnam (SBV): Reduced the short-term lending rate cap 
for priority sectors by 50 bps; issued a circular on refinancing the Vietnam Social 
Policy Bank (VSPB) up to VND 16 trillion at 0 per cent interest rate; asked credit 
institutions to channel credit to 5 priority economic sectors, and to accelerate 
consumer loans to meet legitimate demand of individuals and households. 
• West Bank and Gaza – Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA): Launched an SME 
fund to provide soft loans to SMEs impacted by the crisis.      
• Zimbabwe – RBZ: Increased private sector lending facility by the central bank from 
ZW$1 billion to ZW$2.5 billion. 
2. Prudential policy: Regulation and supervision 
(5) Microprudential 
instruments 
• Algeria – BDA: Eased solvency, liquidity and non-performing loan ratios for banks. 
Allowed banks to extend payments of some loans without a need to provision 
against them. 
• Aruba – CBVA: Lowered the minimum capital adequacy ratio from 16 to 14 per 
cent and the prudential liquidity ratio from 18 to 15 per cent. Increased the 
maximum allowed loan-to-deposit ratio from 80 to 85 per cent. 
• Australia – Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA): Provided temporary 
relief from capital requirement, allowing banks to utilise some of their current large 
buffers to facilitate ongoing lending to the economy as long as minimum capital 
requirements are met. 
• Bahrain – Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB): Reduced the cash reserve ratio for retail 
banks from 5 to 3 per cent and relaxed the LVR for new residential mortgages. 
• Barbados – Central Bank of Barbados (CBBB): Lowered the securities ratio for banks 
from 17.5 to 5 per cent and eliminated the 1.5 per cent securities ratio for non-
bank deposit taking licensees. 
• Belarus – National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (NBRB): Mitigated a number of 




• Belize – Central Bank of Belize (CBBZ): Reduced the statutory cash reserve 
requirements and reduced risk-weights for banks on loans in the tourism sector 
from 100 to 50 per cent. 
• Botswana – Bank of Botswana (BOB): Relaxed rules to meet capital requirements 
and introduced measures to improve liquidity; reduced capital adequacy ratio for 
banks. 
• Brazil – BCB: Changed capital requirements for small financial institutions, and 
allowed banks to reduce provisions for contingent liability provided the funds are 
lent to SMEs.      
• Cabo Verde – BDCV: Reduced the capital adequacy ratio. 
• Cambodia – NBC: Delayed additional increases in the Capital Conservation Buffer.     
• Chile – BCC: Expanded eligible currencies for meeting reserve requirements in 
foreign currencies, made Central Bank regulations for bank liquidity flexible. 
Relaxed the LCR (the ratio remains unchanged but temporary deviations could be 
tolerated on a case-by case basis).            
• Curaçao and Sint Maarten – Centrale Bank van Curaçao en Sint Maarten (CBCS): 
Announced that commercial banks are allowed to exceed the debt service ratio 
from 37 per cent to a maximum of 50 per cent. 
• Cyprus – CBCY: Released capital and liquidity buffers for banks directly supervised 
by the CBCY (€100 million); simplified documentation requirements for new short-
term loans and other credit facilities.   
• Czech Republic – CNB: Relaxed credit ratios for new mortgages, increased the 
maximum recommended LVR and the debt-service-to-income ratio and removed 
the debt-to-income ratio from its list of recommendations. 
• Democratic Republic of the Congo – BCCD: Postponed the adoption of new 
minimum capital requirements. 
• Denmark – Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (DFSA): Announced case by 
case relaxation of regulation on the LCR requirement. 
• Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and Spain – ECB/ESCB Banking Supervision: Decided on a temporary basis 
to exercise flexibility in the classification requirements and expectations on loss 
provisioning for non-performing loans; provided temporary capital relief for market 
risk by adjusting the prudential floor to banks’ current minimum capital 
requirement; made changes to the capital requirements regulation (CRR 2), 
including greater flexibility in the application of the EU’s accounting and 
prudential rules, which are aimed at facilitating bank lending to support the 
economy. 
• Eswatini – Central Bank of Eswatini (CBSZ): Reduced the liquidity requirement. 
• Ghana – BOG: Reduced the capital conservation buffer from 3 to 1.5 per cent. 
• Guinea – BCRG: Introduced measures to mitigate prudential requirements which 
included lowering the LCR; suspending the non-performing loan classification and 
relaxing the limits on foreign exchange positions. 
• Guyana – BOGY: Lowered liquid asset requirements for demand deposits, savings 
and time deposits. 
• Hong Kong – HKMA: Encouraged banks to deploy their liquidity buffers more 
flexibly, and ease interbank funding conditions by reducing the issuance size of 
Exchange Fund Bills; permitted banks to delay of loan payment, extension of loan 
tenors, and principal moratoriums for affected SMEs, sectors and households as 
appropriate and to the extent permitted by the banks’ risk management 
principles. 
• India – RBI: Reduced the LCR; directed banks to assign 0 per cent risk weight on 
the credit facilities extended under the emergency credit line guarantee scheme. 
• Israel – BOIL: Reduced the bank’s regulatory capital requirement; increased the 
LVR cap on residence-backed loans; eliminated the additional 1 per cent capital 
requirement on housing loans; allowed banks to calculate the debt-payment to 
income ratio for mortgage loans using pre-crisis income, under certain 
circumstances; raised the cap (from 20 to 22 per cent) on the banks’ loan portfolio 
allocated to construction companies. 
• Italy – BDI: Allowed possibility to temporarily operate below selected capital and 
liquidity requirements; extended some reporting obligations. 
• Japan – Financial Services Authority (FSAJ): Permitted banks to assign zero risk 
weights to loans guaranteed with public guarantee schemes. 
• Kazakhstan – NBK: Lowered risk weights for SMEs, for FX loans and for syndicated 




• Kenya – Central Bank of Kenya (CBKE): Lowered cash reserve ratio. 
• Republic of Korea – BOK: Temporarily eased loan-to-deposit ratios for banks and 
other financial institutions and the domestic currency LCR for banks.  
• Kuwait – CBK: Decreased the risk weights for SMEs in calculation of risk-weighted 
assets for determining capital adequacy; reduced banks’ capital adequacy 
requirements; reduced the regulatory net stable funding ratio and liquidity core 
ratio, reduced the liquidity ratio and increased the LVR limits. 
• Kyrgyz Republic – NBKR: Lowered or removed liquidity ratios and reduced risk 
weights of FX corporate and retail loans. 
• Malaysia – BNM: Temporarily eased regulatory and supervisory compliance on 
banks to help support loan deferment and restructuring. 
• Malta – Bank Ċentrali ta' Malta (BCTM): Relaxed debt-service-to-income limits for 6 
months. 
• Morocco – BKAM: Authorised banks to go below the 100 per cent LCR until end of 
June 2020; provisioned requirements are suspended for loans benefiting from a 
temporary payment moratorium until end of June 2020; reduced the capital 
conservation buffer by 50 bps for one year. 
• Myanmar – CBM: Revised the formula for calculating the liquidity ratio. 
• Namibia – Bank of Namibia (BON): Relaxed the determination on liquidity risk 
management and reduced the capital conservation buffer. 
• The Netherlands – DNB: Allowed banks under direct supervision of the DNB to 
exclude specific central bank exposures when calculating their leverage ratios. 
• Nepal – NRB: Raised the LVR for personal residential home loans. 
• New Zealand – RBNZ: Reduced bank’s core funding ratio requirement to 50 per 
cent from 75 per cent; regulatory change requiring higher capital for banks has 
been postponed. Removed mortgage LVR restrictions. 
• Norway – NB: Temporarily eased mortgage regulations, in particular increased the 
percentage of mortgages that can deviate from the regulations. 
• Oman – Central Bank of Oman (CBO): Reduced the capital conservation buffer 
and increased the lending ratio ceiling (net credit to deposit base). 
• Pakistan – SBP: Reduced the capital conservation buffer and relaxed the debt 
burden ratio for consumer loans. 
• Philippines – BSP: Relaxed prudential regulations regarding marking-to-market of 
debt securities. 
• Poland – NBP: Granted flexibility on how banks meet capital and liquidity 
requirements; reduced the risk weight for properties to reduce bank capital 
requirements. 
• Russian Federation – CBR: Temporarily eased regulation for banks intended to help 
corporate borrowers; introduced new credit risk assessment methods and lowered 
risk weights in mortgage lending; applied lower risk weights to subordinated bonds 
(including perpetual bonds) of largest non-financial corporations; postponed 
higher risk coefficients for bank holdings of non-financial corporations capital; 
extended lower risk coefficients at 70 per cent for loans to medical and 
pharmaceutical companies; reduced the risk coefficient on loans to non-
commodity exporters guaranteed by EXCAR from 20 to 0 per cent to promote 
high-tech exports. 
• São Tomé and Príncipe – BCSTP: Temporarily eased some prudential ratios. 
• Serbia – NBSR: Relaxed the LVR cap for first-home-buyer mortgage loans. 
• Singapore – MAS: Adjusted selected regulatory requirements and supervisory 
programmes. 
• Slovak Republic – Národná Banka Slovenska (NBS): Implemented measure that 
allowed banks to partially meet Pillar 2 requirements using capital instruments that 
do not qualify as common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital; banks may, in duly justified 
cases, temporarily be permitted to operate below the level of capital defined by 
the capital conservation buffer; banks were temporarily exempted from full 
compliance with the LCR where justified. 
• Solomon Islands – CBSI: Relaxed some commercial banks’ prudential guidelines. 
• South Africa – SARB: Announced temporary relief on bank capital requirements 
and reduction in the LCR from 100 to 80 per cent to provide additional liquidity 
and counter financial system risks. 
• Sri Lanka – CBSL: Reduced the LCR and net stable funding ratios; capital 
conservation buffers and loan classification rules have been relaxed. 
• Spain – BDE: Applied flexibility for setting of transition periods and the intermediate 
minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities targets. 




• Tajikistan – NBT: Relaxed enforcement of prudential requirements. 
• Turkey – TCMB: Increased the LVR limit on mortgages; Turkish Banking Regulation 
and Supervisory Agency (BRSA): reduced the minimum asset ratio. 
• Ukraine – NBU: Delayed the introduction of additional capital buffers, including the 
capital conservation buffer and the systemic buffer; postponed stress testing; 
abolished the requirements for minimum statutory capital to increase. 
• United Arab Emirates – CBUAE: Allowed the use of banks’ excess capital buffers 
(AED 50 billion); increased LVRs for first-time home buyers by 5 percentage points; 
raised the limit on banks’ exposure to the real estate sector from to 30 per cent of 
risk-weighted assets, subject to adequate provisioning; relaxed the net stable 
funding resources ratio until the end of 2021. 
• United Kingdom – Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA): Set Pillar 2A requirements 
as a nominal amount instead of a percentage of total Risk Weighted Assets; 
temporarily allowed firms to offset the increase in risk-weighted assets in order to 
mitigate the possibility of procyclical market risk capital requirements due to the 
automatic application of a higher Value-at-Risk (VaR) multiplier through a 
commensurate reduction in risks-not-in-VAR capital requirements. 
• United States – FED: Temporarily excluded holdings of U.S. Treasury Securities and 
deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks from the calculation of the supplementary 
leverage ratio for holding companies; lowered community bank leverage ratio to 
8 per cent; PPP covered loans received a 0 per cent risk weight; assets acquired 
and subsequently pledged as collateral to the MMLF and PPPLF facilities will not 
lead to additional regulatory capital requirements. 
• West Bank and Gaza – PMA: Lowered the liquidity requirement by 1 per cent. 
• Vanuatu – RBV: Reduced the commercial banks’ capital adequacy ratio. 
(6) Macroprudential 
instruments 
• Azerbaijan – Central bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan (CBAR): Relaxed the 
capital requirements (system wide and the countercyclical capital buffer) and risk 
weights on mortgage loans. 
• Belgium – National Bank of Belgium (NBB): Reduced the countercyclical bank 
capital buffer to 0 per cent. 
• Bulgaria – Central Bank of the Republic of Bulgaria (BNB): Cancelled the increase 
of the countercyclical capital buffer. 
• Canada – Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI): Lowered the 
domestic stability buffer for domestic systemically important banks. 
• Costa Rica – BCCR: Temporarily reduced in the minimum accumulation of 
countercyclical provisions for financial entities to zero. 
• Cyprus – CBC: Introduced an additional capital release measure, with a 12-month 
extension of the phased-in introduction of other systemically important institutions 
capital buffer. 
• Czech Republic – CNB: Reduced the countercyclical capital buffer rate by 75 bps 
to 1 per cent. 
• Denmark – DN: Released the countercyclical capital buffer and cancelled the 
planned increases meant to take effect later. 
• Estonia – Eesti Pank: Reduced the systemic risk buffer for the commercial banks 
from 1 to 0 per cent. 
• Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and Spain – ECB/ESCB Banking Supervision: Allowed significant institutions 
to operate temporarily below the Pillar 2 Guidance, the capital conservation 
buffer, and the LCR; front-loaded new rules on the composition of capital to meet 
Pillar 2 Requirement to release additional capital; permitted appropriate release of 
the countercyclical capital buffer by the national macroprudential authorities will 
enhance its capital relief measures; allowed banks under direct supervision (i.e. the 
largest banks) to exclude cash holdings and central bank reserves from the 
calculation of their leverage ratio until end June 2021. 
• Finland – BOF: Introduced 1 ppt reduction in the structural buffer requirements of 
all credit institutions by removing the systemic risk buffer and adjusting institution-
specific requirements; Finland’s Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA) relaxed to 
90 per cent the macroprudential limit on loan-to-collateral ratios for residential 
mortgages. 
• France – BdF: Reduced the countercyclical bank capital buffer to 0 per cent. 
• Germany – Bundesbank: Released the countercyclical capital buffer for banks 
from 0.25 to 0 per cent. 
• Hong Kong – HKMA: Reduced the countercyclical capital buffer from 2 to 1 per 




non-residential properties by raising the LVR cap to 50 per cent from 40 per cent 
for general cases. 
• Hungary – MNB: Reduced the Foreign Exchange Coverage Ratio; temporary 
elimination of additional capital buffer requirement for systemically-important 
banks. 
• Iceland – Sedlabanki: Reduced the countercyclical capital buffer from 2 to 0 per 
cent. 
• India – RBI: Increased the large exposure limit. 
• Indonesia – BI: Adjusted macroprudential regulation to ease liquidity conditions 
and support bond market stability. 
• Ireland – Central Bank of Ireland (CBIE): Released the countercyclical capital 
buffer, which will be reduced from 1 to 0 per cent. 
• Japan – FSAJ: Permitted banks to draw down their capital conservation and 
systemically important bank buffers to support credit supply, and draw down their 
stock of high quality liquid assets below the minimum LCR requirement. 
• Lithuania – Bank of Lithuania (LBLT): Reduced the countercyclical capital buffer 
from 1 to 0 per cent. 
• The Netherlands – De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB): Reduced systemic buffer 
requirements for the three largest banks to support bank lending; provided 
temporary regulatory relief to less significant banking institutions; planned 
introduction of a floor for mortgage loan risk weighting is postponed. 
• Nepal – NRB: Released the requirement for banks to build up the 2 per cent 
countercyclical capital buffer that was due in July 2020. 
• Norway – NB: Eased the countercyclical capital buffer by 1.5 percentage points; 
banks can temporarily breach the LCR. 
• Poland – NBP: Repealed the 3 per cent systemic risk buffer for bank capital 
requirements. 
• Portugal – Banco de Portugal (BP): Relaxing some aspects of its macroprudential 
measures for consumer credit; series of measures directed to less significant banks 
under its supervision; possibility to temporarily operate below selected capital and 
liquidity requirements. 
• Russian Federation – CBR: Introduced measures to ease liquidity regulations for 
systemically important credit institutions and cancelled add-ons to risk weights for 
mortgage loans. 
• Slovak Republic – NBS: Lowered the capital buffer for systemically important 
institutions for one of the systemically important banks (Postova Banka) from 1 to 
0.25 per cent, effective 1 January 2021. 
• Spain – BdE: Adopted new macroprudential liquidity tool empowering the National 
Securities Market Commission to modify requirements applicable to management 
companies of Collective Investment Schemes. 
• South Africa – SARB: Extended easing of macroprudential policies until further 
notice. 
• Sweden – Riksbank: Eased countercyclical capital buffer by 2.5 percentage points; 
introduced the possibility for banks to temporarily breach the LCR for individual 
currencies and for total currencies; suspended amortisation requirement; 
extended the phase-in period for banks to comply with the new minimum 
requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities. 
• Switzerland – SNB: Deactivated the countercyclical capital buffers; Swiss Financial 
Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) temporarily excluded deposits held at central 
banks from the calculation of banks’ leverage ratio. 
• Turkey – Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu (BDDK): Loosened the 
macroprudential restrictions on credit card spending by low-income households. 
• United Kingdom – BoE: Reduced the UK countercyclical buffer rate to 0 per cent 
from a pre-existing path towards 2; Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA): 
postponed the publication of results of 2019 Insurance Stress Test 2019 (including a 
climate change exploratory exercise) and the next Insurance Stress Test until 2022; 
PRA and Financial Policy Committee: postponed the launch of the Climate 









3. Other central banking or supervisory policies 
(7) Further financing 
schemes and other 
initiatives 
• Cambodia – NBC: Published guidelines to financial institutions on loan restructuring 
for borrowers experiencing financial difficulties (but still performing) in priority 
sectors (tourism, garments, construction, transportation and logistics).  
• Chile – CMFC: Used mortgage guarantees to safeguard SME loans. 
• Fiji – RBF: Expanded the SME Credit Guarantee Scheme to assist small entities. 
• Indonesia – BI: Introduced initiatives to further financial deepening, access to 
financial services, and monetary operations, including by facilitating collaboration 
between the banking industry and fintech companies, introducing Sharia-
compliant instruments and including digital payment in various sectors. 
• Jordan – CBJ: Reduced the cost and expanded the coverage of guarantees 
provided by the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation on SME loans to the tourism 
sector. 
• Mauritius – BOM: Introduced special credit line of Rs5 billion (1.1 per cent or GDP) 
through commercial banks for affected firms to meet their cash flow and working 
capital requirements. 
• Nigeria – CBNG: Coordinated a private sector special intervention initiative 
targeting N120 billion (US$333 million) to fight COVID-19.  
• Peru – BCRP: Approved 60 billion soles (over 8.8 per cent of GDP) package in 
liquidity assistance (backed by government guarantees) to support lending and 
the payments chain.  
• Singapore – MAS: Introduced S$125 million support package to sustain and 
strengthen financial services and fintech capabilities (funded by the Financial 
Sector Development Fund, this package has three main pillars: supporting 
workforce training and manpower costs; strengthening digitalisation and 
operational resilience; and enhancing fintech firms’ access to digital tools). 
• Sri Lanka – CBSL: Construction sector is eligible to borrow from banks with 
government guarantees. 
• Timor-Leste – Banco Central de Timor-Leste (BCTL): Extended access to the Credit 
Guarantee System to micro-enterprises and increased the type of economic 
activities eligible for the programme. 
• United Kingdom – BoE: Launched the joint HM Treasury–Bank of England Covid 
Corporate Financing Facility which, together with the Coronavirus Business Loans 
Interruption Scheme, makes £330 billion of loans and guarantees available to 
businesses (15 per cent of GDP). 
• Uruguay – BCU: Expanded the fund that guarantees loans for SMEs from US$50 
million to US$500 million (utilising financing from international organiszations). 
(8) Management of 
central bank 
portfolios 








implemented in  
the context of 
COVID-19) 
• Brazil – BCB: Launched sustainability agenda to embed green and climate issues 
into its policies and decisions on currency reserves management, bank stress tests 
and lending criteria. 
• China – PBC: Released draft Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue (2020 
edition) which will unify green bond guidelines.  
• Colombia – Financial Superintendence of Colombia: Created Sustainable Finance 
Working Group to implement its sustainability strategy; published a Good Practice 
Guide for Issuing Green Bonds. 
• Costa Rica – BCCR: Included analytical activities on climate change within 
Strategic Plan 2020-2023. 
• Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and Spain – ECB: Launched public consultation on guide on climate-
related and environmental risks. 
• Ecuador – Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE): Leads newly launched Sustainable 
Finance Initiative. 
• France – BdF: Introduced responsible investment strategy focused on five 
objectives: (i) getting aligned with a 2°C trajectory; (ii) contributing to financing 
the energy and ecological transition; (iii) integrating a filter into its asset 
management procedures based on ESG ratings and climate indicators; (iv) 
exercising its voting rights (for 100 per cent of companies in which it is a direct 
shareholder); and (v) influencing issuers. Autorité de Contôle Prudentiel et de 
Résolution (ACPR): Published report on ‘Governance and management of 
climate-related risks by French banking institutions’. 
• Georgia – NBG: Published ESG reporting and disclosure principles. 
• Germany – Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin): Announced sustainable 
finance is as a supervisory priority. 
• Hong Kong – HKMA: Created Green and Sustainable Finance Cross Agency 
Steering Group. 
• Hungary – MNB: Endorsed the UN’s Principles for Responsible Investment. 
• Malaysia – BNM: Issued the first cohort of the VBIAF Sectoral Guides on Palm Oil, 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency. VBIAF Sectoral Guides also support the 
climate-change initiative by BNM. 
• Mexico – Banxico: Created a Sustainable Finance Committee. 
• Mongolia – Mongolbank: Launched Green Loan Statistics based on the Mongolian 
Green Taxonomy (2019) to calculate the amount and ratio of green loans in 
portfolios. 
• Philippines – BSP: Introduced Sustainable Finance Framework to safeguard the 
financial system from the evolving material hazards from climate change and 
energy transition risk including stranded assets. 
• Russia – CBR: Began consultation on the prospects for estimating and monitoring of 
climate risks. 
• Singapore – MAS: Issued three consultation papers on Proposed Guidelines on 
Environmental Risk Management for banks, asset managers and insurers. 
• South Africa – SARB: Published working paper on ‘Climate change and its 
implications for central banks in emerging and developing economies’. 
• Sweden – Riksbank: Launched consultation on the sustainable finance strategy for 
improved and uniform disclosure of climate-related risks. 
• Switzerland – FINMA: Began addressing climate risks in the financial sector. 
• Thailand – BOT: Signed MoU with UK government to develop the financial sector to 
support inclusive growth with consideration for the wider implications of policies on 
the economy, environment – in particular risks from climate change – and those 
who are disadvantaged in society. 







ACPR [Autorité de Contôle Prudentiel et de Résolution] (2020) Governance and Management of 
Climate-related Risks by French Banking Institutions: Some Good Practices. Paris: Autorité de 
Contôle Prudentiel et de Résolution. https://acpr.banque-
france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/20200525_synthese_gouvernance_anglais.pdf  
Bank of England (2020) The Bank of England’s climate-related financial disclosure 2020. London: 
Bank of England. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/annual-
report/2020/climate-related-financial-disclosure-report-2019-
20.pdf?la=en&hash=5DA959C54540287A2E90C823807E089055E6721B 
Battiston S, Mandel A, Monasterolo I, Schütze F, Visentin G (2017) A Climate Stress-test of the 
Financial System, Nature Climate Change 7: 283–288 
Bolton P, Despres M, Pereira da Silva L A, Samana F, Svartzman R (2020) The green swan - Central 
banking and financial stability in the age of climate change. Basel: Bank for International 
Settlements 
Borio C (2020) The prudential response to the Covid-19 crisis. Speech on the occasion of the Bank’s 
Annual General Meeting in Basel on 30 June. Basel: Bank for International Settlement. 
https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp200630a.pdf 
Bailey A (2020) Statement on Bank’s commitment to combatting climate change. 01 July. London: 
Bank of England. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2020/july/statement-on-banks-
commitment-to-combatting-climate-change 
BSP [Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas] (2020) Sustainable Finance Framework, Circular No. 1085. Manila: 
Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas. 
www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/regulations/attachments/2020/c1085.pdf 
Buhr B, Volz U, Donovan C, Kling G, Lo Y, Murinde V, Pullin N (2018) Climate Change and the Cost of 
Capital in Developing Countries. London and Geneva: Imperial College London; SOAS 
University of London; UN Environment 
Dafermos Y, Gabor D, Nikolaidi M, van Lerven F (2020a) Decarbonising the Bank of England’s 
Pandemic QE. London: New Economics Foundation 
Dafermos Y, Gabor D, Nikolaidi M, Pawloff A, van Lerven F (2020b) Decarbonising is Easy. Beyond 
Market Neutrality in the ECB’s Corporate QE. London: New Economics Foundation 
Dafermos Y, Gabor D, Nikolaidi M, van Lerven F (2020c) Greening the Eurosystem collateral 
framework. Presentation given at the INSPIRE Festival 2020, 2 Septmeber. 
Dikau S, Volz U (2019) Central Banking, Climate Change and Green Finance, in: Sachs J, Woo W T, 
Yoshino N, Taghizadeh-Hesary F (eds.) Springer Handbook of Green Finance: Energy Security 
and Sustainable Development. Heidelberg and New York: Springer: 81-102  
Dikau S, Volz U (2020a) Central Bank Mandates, Sustainability Objectives and the Promotion of 
Green Finance. SOAS Department of Economics Working Paper No. 232. London: SOAS.  
Dikau S, Volz U (2020b, forthcoming) Out of the Window? Green Monetary Policy in China: Window 
Guidance and the Promotion of Sustainability 
Dikau S, Robins N, Täger M (2019) Building a Sustainable Financial System: The State of Practice and 
Future Priorities. Financial Stability Review. Madrid: Banco de España 
ECB [European Central Bank] (2020a) ECB Launches Public Consultation on its Guide on Climate-
related and Environmental Risks, Press Release, 20 May. Frankfurt: European Central Bank. 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ssm.pr200520~0795c47d
73.en.html  
ECB [European Central Bank] (2020b) ECB to Accept Sustainability-linked Bonds as Collateral, Press 





Evans S (2020) The World has already passed ‘peak oil’, BP figures reveal, Carbon Brief, 15 September. 
https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-world-has-already-passed-peak-oil-bp-figures-reveal 
Fender I, McMorrow M, Sahakyan Z, Vahe O (2019) Green Bonds: The Reserve Management Perspective. 
BIS Quarterly Review. Basel: Bank for International Settlements 
HKMA [Hong Kong Monetary Authority] (2020) Joint Statement on the Establishment of the Green 
and Sustainable Finance Cross-Agency Steering Group, Press Release, 5 May. 
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2020/05/20200505-8/ 
INSPIRE (2020) Building the analytical foundations for greening the financial system - The first report of 
the International Network for Sustainable Financial Policy Insights, Research and Exchange. 
London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London 




Khalaf R and Arnold M (2020) Lagarde Puts Green Policy Top of Agenda in ECB Bond Buying. 
Financial Times, 8 July. https://www.ft.com/content/f776ea60-2b84-4b72-9765-2c084bff6e32 
Look C (2020) Lagarde Says ECB Needs to Question Market Neutrality on Climate. Bloomberg, 14 
October. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-14/lagarde-says-ecb-needs-to-
question-market-neutrality-on-climate 
Ma J, Caldecott B, Volz U (eds., 2020) Case Studies of Environmental Risk Analysis Methodologies. 




Matikainen S, Campiglio E, Zenghelis D (2017) The Climate Impact of Quantitative Easing. London: 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of 
Economics and Political Science. http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/ClimateImpactQuantEasing_Matikainen-et-al-1.pdf  
Monnin P (2020) Shifting Gears: Integrating Climate Risks in Monetary Policy Operations. CEP Policy 
Brief No. 2020/1. Zurich: Council on Economic Policies 
NGFS [Network for Greening the Financial System] (2019) A Sustainable and Responsible Investment 
Guide for Central Banks’ Portfolio Management. Paris: Central Banks and Supervisors Network 
for Greening the Financial System 
NGFS (2020a) Guide for Supervisors Integrating Climate-related and Environmental Risks into 
Prudential Supervision. Paris: Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the 
Financial System. 
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_guide_for_supervisors.pdf 
NGFS (2020b) Statement on the Need for a Green Recovery Out of the Covid-19 Crisis. Paris: Central 
Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System. 
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/green_recovery_statement_-
_june_2020.pdf  
NGFS (2020c) Guide to Climate Scenario Analysis for Central Banks and Supervisors. Paris: Central 
Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System. 
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_guide_scenario_analysis_fin
al.pdf  
NGFS (2020d) Climate Change and Monetary Policy: Initial Takeaways. Paris: Central Banks and 
Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System. 
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/climate_change_and_monetary
_policy_final.pdf  
NGFS (2020e) The Macroeconomic and Financial Stability Impacts of Climate Change: Research 





NGFS (2020f) Overview of Environmental Risk Analysis by Financial Institutions. Paris: Central Banks 
and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System. 
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/overview_of_environmental_risk_
analysis_by_financial_institutions.pdf  
Reuters (2020) Highlights-Next Bank of England governor Bailey speaks in parliament, March 4. 
https://de.reuters.com/article/britain-boe-highlights/highlights-next-bank-of-england-
governor-bailey-speaks-in-parliament-idINL8N2AX59B  
Schnabel I (2020) Never Waste a Crisis: COVID-19, Climate Change and Monetary Policy. Speech at 
a virtual roundtable on “Sustainable Crisis Responses in Europe”, organised by the INSPIRE 
research network, 17 July. 
Schoenmaker D (2019) Greening Monetary Policy. Rotterdam School of Management Working 
Paper. Rotterdam: Erasmus University 
Schoenmaker D, van Tilburg R (2016) What Role for Financial Supervisors in Addressing Environmental 
Risks? Comparative Economic Studies 58(3): 317-334 
Thallinger G, Robins N (2020) Post-COVID recovery packages must quicken the pace to net-zero 
carbon emissions. Responsible Investor, 22 April. https://www.responsible-
investor.com/articles/post-covid-recovery-packages-must-quicken-the-pace-to-net-zero-
carbon-emissions   
van ’t Klooster J, van Tilburg R (2020) Targeting a Sustainable Recovery with Green TLTROs. London: 
Positive Money. www.positivemoney.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Green-TLTROs.pdf  
 
